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ABSTRACT
ELLEN GUTMAN GALANTUCCI: Normal Winners: The Strategies of Strong
Candidates.
(Under the direction of James A. Stimson)
Much research has focused on what challengers do to win an election. Little research
has been dedicated to exploring the behavior of candidates who are expected to win their
elections. Candidates who find themselves in close races are likely to act differently than
candidates in landslide elections because, as Kahn and Kenney (1997) suggest, voters eval-
uate candidates differently based on the intensity of the election. What things do candidates
who are expected to easily win their elections discuss?
By content analyzing websites of candidates for the U.S. House, Senate, and state gov-
ernorships from 2008, I find that candidates who are expected to win their elections are
likely to act in ways that will not draw attention to the election. They are less likely to
discuss controversial issues or mention their opponents than candidates in close races or
those expected to lose. Alternatively, they focus on valence issues and constituent service.
The same is true for their advertisements. Expected winners air fewer ads than candidates
in competitive elections and the ones they do air tend to have less controversial content.
In addition to the content differences between expected winners and competitive can-
didates, the spending patterns are much different. When an incumbent faces a quality
challenger, he or she is likely to spend significantly more money than an incumbent who
does not face a quality challenger. The two most common theories for the reasons the in-
cumbents spend so little are that they want to avoid raising funds in the future (Jacobson
2004) and that they want to save a war chest for future elections (Sorauf 1988, Goldenberg,
Traugott, and Baumgartner 1986). However, by looking at the spending patterns of can-
didates expected to win their elections, I find that they spend nearly as much money and
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expend as much effort to raise funds as other candidates, so that cannot possibly explain
the decisions of these candidates. I also find that expected winners are willing to donate
large sums of money to other candidates, parties, and committees, leaving them with fairly
small war chests, so that cannot explain their behavior either. Instead, I find that expected
winners make a strategic decision to refrain from spending on their own campaigns.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the citizens of the United States went to the polls in early November to vote in
national elections, just like they do every two years. The people needed to make many im-
portant decisions regarding the election that would effect the future of our country. Would
they choose to vote for Barack Obama or John McCain for the presidency? Did they prefer
the Democrat or the Republican for the House of Representatives? Who should be their
new governor or senator? Was it even worth their time to vote? And how would they make
these important decisions?
In northwestern Ohio, voters found themselves making a familiar choice for the House
of Representatives. They would have the choice between the incumbent, Marcy Kaptur,
who had held the seat for two and a half decades, and the challenger, Republican Bradley
Leavitt, who had also challenged Kaptur in 2006. Kaptur used the same strategy as she had
in the previous election. She spent under a quarter of a million dollars campaigning, not
including donations she made to other candidates. She did not run a single televised adver-
tisement. She sent a few fliers to voters in her district but they did not provide voters much
information about her plans for the next two years (The Center for Responsive Politics).
When the election day came, the result was the same as it had been two years prior: Kaptur
won with about 75% of the vote. How was it possible that a candidate could put nearly no
effort into her reelection and still win so handily?
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Two years later, Kaptur faced a much more well financed candidate than she had in
2008, Republican Rich Iott. Iott raised and spent nearly two million dollars on his challenge
against Kaptur. He also had the country leaning in his direction - he was a Tea Party favorite
in an election in which Republicans would take over many previously Democratic seats.
While Kaptur changed her strategy slightly, she did not stray too far from her 2008 plan.
She spent less than a third of the total amount of money that was spent by her opponent.
She ran a few television ads this time, but they still did not tell voters much about her;
her primary message for voters was that she “supports the troops” (Center for Responsive
Politics, Wisconsin Advertising Project). She won the 2010 election by about 20% of the
vote. While it was not the 50% she won by in 2008, her strategy was still working. How
could a candidate spend so little compared to her opponent, hardly campaigning at all, and
still win so easily?
About 2,000 miles west of Ohio, a very different election was occurring in 2008. Re-
publican Bill Sali, a freshman in the House of Representatives, was also running for reelec-
tion. Republican Butch Otter had left the seat in 2006 to run for governor and Sali won a
close primary and a close general election to replace him. The 2006 election had been a
hard fought battle but running for reelection should have been easier for Sali. After all, the
First District of Idaho was heavily Republican. John McCain would win the district with
over 60% of the vote that year; George W. Bush had received nearly 70% four years earlier.
And the Cook Political Report had labeled the election “Solid Republican.”
Sali began the election with force and purpose. He pegged his opponent, Walt Minnick,
as a radical, saying “I ask you, what is Walt Minnick afraid of? I’ll tell you - he’s afraid
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Idahoans will find out who the real Minnick is. An environmental extremist.” (Warren
2008) Sali explained to voters that his opponent would “increase taxes” once in office by
referencing a statement Minnick had made more than a decade before, though Sali was
misrepresenting Minnick’s actual views (Idaho Statesman 2008). Voters in Idaho should
have liked what Sali was telling them; they did not want their taxes raised nor did they
like extremists. Additionally, Sali was an incumbent Republican. All arrows should have
pointed to an easy reelection victory. As the election approached, Sali lost ground, with
pollsters predicting either candidate could potentially win. Then, on November 4th, Walt
Minnick defeated Bill Sali by just over 4,000 votes. How could such a candidate possibly
lose his reelection campaign?
Both Marcy Kaptur and Bill Sali “should” have easily won their elections. They were
both incumbents running in districts that largely favored their party. However, they took
very different approaches and strategies. Kaptur spent very little time campaigning and told
voters almost nothing about her legislative plans for after the election. Sali, on the other
hand, spent much more time and effort campaigning. He met with constituents, told voters
why they should avoid his opponent, and discussed his plans for his time in Washington
following the election. So how can it be that Sali lost the election and Kaptur won so
easily? Why would voters support the candidate they rarely saw but oppose the candidate
who was honest with them about his goals and plans for his time in office, most of which
seemed to align with the views of the district?
But Kaptur and Sali are not the only candidates that devise surprising campaign strate-
gies. Sander Levin ran for reelection in the House in 2008, as well. The Democrat had
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been in office for two and a half decades, easily maintaining his seat. He raised a moderate
amount of money compared to many other candidates and spent about $200,000 on his
campaign. At the end of the election, rather than saving any money he had left over, he
donated nearly $400,000 to others as he had spent on his own campaign, with the primary
recipient of his donation being the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Cen-
ter for Responsive Politics). Why would a candidate choose to give more money away than
he spent on his own election? Why would Levin choose to donate so much money rather
than saving it for a future election?
A discussion of the different strategies these candidates took and the rationale behind
them is the main focus of this dissertation. I seek to explain why candidates choose the
electoral strategies that they do. In doing so, I hope to explain more than just what incum-
bents do when running for reelection or how they react to strong challengers. I will look at
different types of incumbents and challengers and consider what they might do in the face
of certain opponents. It will not be a story of incumbents who face quality versus weak
challengers, as many have studied (Jacobson and Kernell 1983, Jacobson 1989, Epstein
and Zemsky 1995). It will be about candidates who “should” win their elections versus
candidates who are not expected to win. It will also consider the strategies of candidates in
close “races,” who often take different strategies than expected winners and losers.
Much of the literature discussing candidate strategy focuses on incumbency as the pri-
mary factor that determines success. While many incumbents running for election will
win their seat again, incumbency has no guarantees. Within research that examines incum-
bents and challengers, there is often a distinction between quality challengers, who have
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held some previous elected office, and non-quality or weak challengers, who have never
held an elected office (Jacobson and Kernell 1983, Jacobson 1989, Epstein and Zemsky
1995). Others have attempted to create indices with additional criteria to determine the
quality of a challenger for office. These include information such as previous attempts
to run for Congress, even if they were unsuccessful, a candidate’s “celebrity status,” and
any previously held non-elected public office. These measures do perform better than the
dichotomous quality measure in predicting candidate behavior (Krasno and Green 1988).
However, incumbency and quality of challenger are certainly not the only factors weighing
into the decisions of these candidates when they choose strategies.
There are many instances in which the quality of challengers does not predict candidate
behavior successfully. Quality challengers who have won elected office previously still
rarely beat incumbents; less than 20% actually defeat the incumbents and win their elec-
tions (Epstein and Zemsky 1995). While 20% is better than the 4% success rate of weak
challengers, it certainly does not explain much about most elections. It does not give a clear
picture of what incumbents are doing in these elections and why they might be choosing the
strategies that they do. While some nuanced measures of the quality of challengers yield
slightly better results (Krasno and Green 1988), it appears from this research that incum-
bency and the quality of the challenger are not the only important factors in determining the
outcome of an election. These studies do not examine the strategies of the candidates once
the election season is in full swing nor do most consider outside factors influencing the
election, such as the coattails of a presidential election. They do not account for the swings
of the country. Many elections, such as the midterm elections of 2010, propel candidates to
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victory who were not expected to be successful when only looking at “quality.” Therefore,
I take a different approach by looking at candidates’ expectations of winning. While the
quality of the challenger is important, many other factors are as well. With the belief that
candidates make decisions based on their expectations of winning rather than one aspect of
their opponents, I look at the influence of such expectations on their strategies.
The question of whether campaigns really matter has also been debated in political
science for many years (Finkel 1993, Key 1966, Campbell et al. 1960, Holbrook 1996).
After all, many elections are highly predictable; the outcome of such elections can often be
predicted long before the candidates have even filed to run (Fair 1978, Brody and Sigelman
1983, Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992, Holbrook 1996, Wlezien and Erikson 1996, Norpoth
1996, Campbell and Garand 2000, Campbell 2000, Hibbs 2000). Does that mean that an
examination of candidates’ strategies is worthless as it does not matter what they do?
I contend that the reason campaigns seem not to matter is because expected winners
choose strategies that will guide them to victory. These strategies are carefully considered
at every step of the electoral process. Expected winners make decisions which will prevent
their opponents from becoming relevant in the election so that the events throughout the
campaign season prevent the election from becoming anything other than predictable. In
other words, the reason campaigns seem not to matter much of the time is because candi-
dates tend to take smart, strategic decisions that help to ensure repeated success.
Plan of this dissertation
Chapter 2 outlines a theory of the strategies that expected winners take in their elections.
It will explain why some candidates might avoid discussing their political beliefs and policy
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goals as well as why they might avoid engaging their opponents. It will present a definition
of “normal winners,” which are candidates expected to win their elections, and discuss
the ways such candidates attempt to prevent their opponents from becoming visible and
relevant in their elections. They are expected to avoid discussing all controversial issues
and do everything they can to keep people from paying close attention to the candidates
and the choice they will have to make on election day.
Chapter 3 will include the first empirical test of this theory. Hundreds of websites from
the 2008 congressional and gubernatorial elections will be tested to determine whether the
patterns outlined in Chapter 2 hold. Normal winners, on average, are found to discuss fewer
controversial issues on their websites, discuss their opponents less frequently, and are even
less likely to mention their party affiliation than other candidates
Chapter 4 looks at the ways candidates spend their campaign funds. The conventional
wisdom is that incumbents in safe elections spend little money because they would prefer
not to raise money (Jacobson 2004) or because they want to keep a war chest (Goldenberg,
Traugott, and Baumgartner 1986, Goidel and Gross 1994, Hersch and McDougall 1994,
Box-Steffensmeier 1996, Hogan 2001) is challenged. The fundraising activities and ex-
penditures of normal winners reveal that, even when expected to win easily, they continue
to ask for donations and then give large sums of money to their party or other candidates
rather than saving it in a war chest. Since neither of these theories holds, it seems expected
winners make the choice to refrain from spending all of the their money as a strategic plan
to avoid making the election more competitive.
Chapter 5 examines televised campaign advertisements to look at another aspect of the
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strategies of candidates. Many normal winners do not air ads during their elections and
the ones who do tend to present very little information to voters. Like with their websites,
normal winners tend to avoid discussing controversial issues and their opponents, instead
preferring to focus on themselves and noncontroversial issues, like their support of safety
from terrorists and a good educational system.
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2 A THEORY OF CANDIDATE STRATEGY
Many different aspects of candidates and elections factor into the campaign decisions of
those seeking office. While many researchers have examined the specific factors, I seek to
look at the overall picture of the election and determine candidate strategies based on their
judgment of the election. We need to move beyond looking at the specific factors and look
for a new method of judging campaign strategies that will provide an explanation as to how
the expectations that candidates have about how their likelihood of winning will influence
their decisions throughout the election season. How can we differentiate between different
types of elections in a way that will allow an investigation into the strategies candidates
pursue?
What Is a “Race?”
Elections can take many different forms. Some are very competitive while others, bar-
ring any particularly unusual circumstances, can be predicted long in advance. On each
election day, voters go to the polls to decide between different candidates in different
“races.” We generally use the word race to describe all of these contests but many cases,
elections are not competitive enough to really be considered races.
So what is a race? First, it must have two or more candidates competing for the po-
sition. An uncontested election is not interesting; if there are not two sides, the outcome
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is predetermined. While there are certainly uncontested elections, most meet this require-
ment.
A second criterion for an election to be considered a race is that either side could win.
This means that an unknown candidate in the contest against a seasoned veteran does not
make it a race; in most cases, these candidates are not viable. Often, even major party can-
didates do not really have a chance in many constituencies. A heavily Republican area will
almost never elect a Democrat; extenuating circumstances would need to exist to make the
Democrat a possible winner of the election. Despite that, both parties will put a candidate
in nearly every electoral contest. Therefore, a race must not just have two candidates but
must have two candidates who each have the potential to win.
Third, an electoral contest is only a race if some people have not made their decision
about which candidate to choose. If all voters have already chosen between the candidates,
the second criterion is not met because both candidates do not have a chance of winning. If
no one can be persuaded by the candidates, their strategies do not matter. If there is nothing
that candidates can do to influence the votes of the people, the contest is predetermined and
not really a race.
My fundamental thesis is that normal winners will do whatever they can to prevent their
elections from becoming races. In all of the things that normal winners can control, they
will attempt to avoid the election becoming close. All of the specifics in this essay are
based on this central expectation.
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How Often Do Races Occur?
These qualifications are fairly hard to meet. In many constituencies, one candidate wins
with a large portion of the vote and voters were not even aware of the other candidate(s) in
the contest. In most election years, at least 90 percent of candidates running for reelection
for the House of Representatives win. Well over half of these incumbents amass more than
60 percent of the two-party vote. Even when an open seat is contested, close to half of the
winners get more than 60 percent of the two-party vote (Jacobson 2004).
One reason so many of these candidates win by such large margins is because of a
general lack of knowledge about challengers. When asked to name the candidates in an
upcoming election for the House, only about half of voters can recall the name of the in-
cumbent candidate; less than 20 percent can name the challenger in most years (Jacobson
2004). While the case of House elections may be more extreme than some other elec-
tions, such as gubernatorial or Senate elections, even fewer people know the names of the
challengers in many state and local races.
This implies that real races are not very common. If almost no one in the district knows
the name of one of the candidates, that candidate has little to no chance of winning. For the
most part, people have already decided which way to vote.
This leaves three different types of elections. Some elections are uncontested. While
this situation is the favorite of candidates since it guarantees victory, there is little that a
candidate can do to ensure that no other candidates enter the race. Second, many elections
are competitive races, in which either candidate could win. These elections are difficult to
predict and candidates have little certainty over the outcome. The third type of election is
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somewhere in the middle: an expected winner has competition but the other candidate is
not a serious threat. When expected winners do have a competitor, there may be things that
can be done to prevent the opponent from becoming serious. While this scenario is not as
ideal as having no opponent at all, it is much easier to be successful than elections with
competitive opponents.
Elections that are won easily can help to lay the groundwork for future elections. Why
would anyone want to challenge a candidate who is nearly guaranteed success? If expected
winners can make it look as though they can win any election by large majorities, strong
potential challengers may choose to avoid running, as failure is a near certainty. By making
decisions that will help to ensure easy success, these candidates may help to create careers
as politicians, not just single terms. This prevents serious challenges in the future and helps
to keep the officials in office for the long-term.
What can a candidate do to ensure that an opponent stays non-competitive? If the
normal, expected winner can set the tone of the election, there may be opportunities to
prevent a non-serious opponent from becoming more competitive. What strategy might
such a candidate take to keep the election easy to win?
Theories of Candidate Strategy
To be able to develop a theory of candidate strategy, it is necessary to assume that
candidates want to win their elections. While it is possible that some candidates have other
goals in running, such as a third party candidate who wants to bring attention to a specific
issue, it appears that candidates try to win their elections. Between the time, money, and
energy spent by candidates during elections, it seems that candidates want to win.
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Most elections have an expected, “normal” outcome, in which the voting patterns of
voters continue from one election to the next. Many voters are partisans, who will vote for
the same party in each electoral contest. There may be short-term forces that change the
portion of the vote one party’s candidate receives, but one candidate is still usually expected
to win. For example, if a Democrat has won the last three elections with 70% of the vote,
even if the country is hostile toward Democrats in the next election, that candidate is still
likely to win. He or she may only receive 60% of the vote, but that will still be more than
enough to secure victory. The underlying party affiliation of voters is enough to make the
election predictable, and therefore “normal” (Converse 1966). Such elections will have one
“normal winner,” who is expected to win on election day. Any opponents to this expected
winner are “normal losers,” because they are projected to be soundly defeated. “Race”
candidates are those in elections with no clear expected winner and loser.
In normal elections, expected winners are often able to gather support even from mem-
bers of the opposing party. While some will continue to support their party’s candidate,
others will vote for the candidate that they know will win. If the voters of a district are 60%
Democratic, a Democratic normal winner is likely to receive even more of the vote than the
party affiliation shows. When a Republican candidate becomes competitive, Republican
voters are likely to switch their support to this candidate rather than the Democrat. When
the election stays non-competitive, the normal winner is likely to continue to pull these
votes from the other side. These elections are ideal for normal winners; they help make
success easy in the election. What can a normal winner do to keep pulling these votes from
the opposing party’s voters and guarantee success?
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Many events outside of the hands of the candidates can influence the choices that voters
make, such as a presidential election influencing the views of voters on candidates for
lower offices. But many things are within the control of normal winners. As much as
normal winners can, they are expected to choose strategies that will allow them to win as
easily as possible. Assuming they have some control over the tenor of the election, normal
winners are expected to do everything they can to avoid the election becoming a race. What
are the things a normal winner can do to prevent a “race?”
Discussing Issues
Candidates have the ability, to some degree, to create an image of themselves in the
minds of voters. They have the opportunity to create a message for voters which includes
information about their policy beliefs, specific plans, and agendas if elected to office. Or,
they can be ambiguous with their messages, leaving out many of the details of their goals
and opinions. Candidates have some ability to choose how much they will talk about issues
throughout their campaigns. They can choose to tell voters their plans for their time in
office, or they can avoid discussing such matters. While candidates may not have complete
control over their ability to discuss issues (if a reporter asks a pointed question, candidates
cannot always completely evade the issue), they do in many outlets, such as advertisements.
What would normal winners be expected to do in such circumstances?
One way for normal winners to avoid having their elections turn into races may be to
avoid discussing position issues. Position issues are inherently controversial and at least
two sided (Stokes 1966). If a normal winner starts publicly discussing a position issue,
it could invite the normal loser into a public debate. It could give the opportunity to the
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normal loser to express him or herself and cause voters to start paying more attention to the
election. Because some voters will disagree with the point of view of the normal winner on
position issues, they may begin to question whether they support this candidate overall. At
that point, some voters may begin to turn to the normal loser when they otherwise would
not have noticed this second candidate, creating a closer election than would otherwise be
expected.
A complete lack of issues throughout the election could be problematic, however. If
voters notice that candidates do not appear to tell them anything about their views, it could
hurt their electoral chances. While some research has shown that discussing few issues can
increase the appeal of candidates to voters (Downs 1957), others have found that it can hurt
the chances of some candidates (Shepsle 1972). If normal winners are concerned about
the possibility of becoming too vague and ambiguous on issues and losing supporters as a
result, they may choose to discuss valence issues as an alternative to position issues.
Valence issues do not provide normal losers the same opportunity to become involved
in the public debate. According to Stokes (1966), valence issues are issues “on which
parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which
they are linked in the public’s mind with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost
everyone approves or disapproves.” Whereas position issues may invite normal winners
into the discussion, valence issues, about which nearly everyone agrees, do not invite the
normal loser to participate. There is no need to contest claims of support for motherhood
and apple pie. We all support America, education, and the troops. If a normal winner says
he or she supports one of those things, no normal winner can respond by saying he or she
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opposes it. Valence issues can help to keep the amount of debate between the candidates
minimal, which could prevent a race from occurring.
In the parts of their campaigns normal winners can control, some may choose not to
explain their views on any issues as all. However, when they do discuss issues, they are
expected to primarily discuss valence issues rather than position issues.
Talking to Opponents
In some elections, the candidates will frequently discuss and debate the issues and the
facts of the election. Many candidates will tell voters how much their opponents will hurt
America or that they are lying about how they will vote on issues. The candidates may also
participate in organized debates, in which voters can compare and contrast the plans of the
competitors.
When such discussions happen, it may become easier for voters to compare the candi-
dates. When the candidates are not speaking to each other, it is like they are running the
100 meter dash on opposite sides of the track. It is hard to tell the differences between their
speeds because they are so far apart. The same is true for politicians; if the candidates are
not comparing themselves or debating, it may be difficult for voters to see the differences
between them.
Normal winners are unlikely to want voters to see these differences. If voters can
compare the candidates because they are talking to or about each other, it means they are
paying attention to the views of both candidates and the normal winner is taking positions
on issues. When voters are comparing the candidates, it means voters could choose either
candidate and either candidate could win the election. Normal winners want to avoid this
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race situation by making it difficult for voters to see the differences between them and their
opponents.
Another potential problem for normal winners in this situation is simply that the normal
losers become more visible to voters. In many cases, normal losers are nearly invisible,
with nearly no name recognition and much less knowledge by voters of their opinions on
issues than for their opponents. However, when normal winners are talking to or about
normal losers, it helps bring attention to these candidates, which they were unlikely to have
otherwise. Normal winners would not be expected to do things that would bring recognition
to their opponents so they are unlikely to discuss their opponents whenever possible.
The discussion of horse race polls may also bring attention to the normal loser. If polls
are released that claim the election is close, regardless of whether or not it is true, it can
make the contest appear to be close to voters. Since voters do not conduct their own public
opinion polls, they tend to believe the polls released by campaigns. If voters believe that
the contest is a race, it can lead them to pay attention to the normal loser, who they might
otherwise ignore. Therefore, normal winners are likely to make it appear as though they
are winning easily and by large margins. They are likely to avoid discussing horse race
polling that gives the appearance that a race is occurring, especially if the polls that say the
election is close. It draws attention to the election and gives credibility to the normal loser
which can make the election appear to be a race.
Relationships with other Politicians
Beyond their opponents, normal winners may not want to be tied to other politicians.
Whether it is the president, a member of Congress, or a governor, discussions of politicians
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can be similar to discussions of issues. Other politicians can be controversial and, whether
positive or negative, discussing them can cause the election to change and create a contro-
versy that normal winners are likely to try to avoid. Even the most loved politician is not
loved by everyone and has the potential to create controversy if associated with a candidate.
The problem of association for normal winners is that other politicians have views,
some of which are well known. For example, if a candidate compares him or herself to
President Barack Obama, voters may begin to assume the candidate has the same views as
the president on everything. Even in places throughout the country where Obama is pop-
ular, voters may dislike some of the things he has done in office. If voters start believing
the normal winner agrees with the things they dislike about Obama, it could hurt the can-
didate’s chances of success because now voters have started to pinpoint his or her opinions
and can judge accordingly. The accuracy of those assessments may even be wrong, but
voters still feel like they know the candidates and may start to judge the candidates based
on their issue positions, which would not have occurred otherwise.
Personal Information
Many candidates choose to discuss their personal lives and histories with voters. Haynes,
Flowers, and Gurian (2002), drawing on Scammell (1998), discuss this as a possible strat-
egy of campaigning. Scammell discusses two types of campaign strategies: competitive
positioning, in which candidates define themselves based on where they are in relation to
other candidates, such as with polling, and substantive positioning, in which candidates
define themselves by the issues. Hanyes, et al. introduce a third: neutral or nonstrategic
positioning. This type of campaigning includes such things as information about campaign
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events, personal information, and other forms of information that are disseminated by every
campaign but are not about issues or the other candidates.
Based on the name, it is pretty obvious that this is viewed by the authors as necessary
but not a way to win elections. However, focusing on these aspects of a candidate can
be quite strategic. It allows candidates to talk about something, so it appears as though
they have something to say, but not talk about anything that could create a race. Personal
information is very unlikely to anger any voters and can help to make a candidate seem
more relatable.
Campaign Spending
Another way for normal winners to avoid races is to limit spending. Though normal
winners generally have the ability to raise large quantities of money, if they spend all of
that money, they might attract attention to the contest. Using money to advertise could
cause people to pay attention to the election that would have otherwise ignored it. When
candidates spend large sums of money on their contests, they are more likely to lose (Ja-
cobson 2004). While it is commonly believed that spending is the effect of a close race, in
that candidates spend more reactively when they have a more difficult election, some can-
didates may believe the opposite: spending a lot of money causes a close election. When
candidates are spending more money in an election, it is usually because they are advertis-
ing more. When candidates advertise more, voters may start paying more attention to their
message. When people start paying attention to an otherwise largely ignored election, it
can turn the contest into a race. In order to prevent this from happening, normal winners
may avoid spending copious amounts of money.
19
Turnout
Some citizens will choose to vote in every election; others will sit out each year. A third
group exists which will choose to vote some of the time. This group can be influenced by
the tone of the elections that are occurring. High turnout may occur because people are
generally excited about one or more contests on the ballot.
Certainly, some candidates have little ability to influence turnout. In a presidential
election year, for example, most of the other contests on the ballot will not motivate people
to get to the polls if the presidential election has not already done so. In other years,
however, some candidates lower on the ballot may have the ability to manipulate turnout.
If high turnout occurs because people are paying attention to a particular election with
a normal winner in the race, then something has gone wrong for that candidate. In this
situation, people are paying attention to a contest that would normally be largely ignored,
which means it has turned into a race. Since normal winners want to avoid turning the
election into a race, they should not encourage a high turnout election.
This does not mean that candidates will stop their mobilization efforts on election day.
Candidates will certainly want to encourage their supporters to get to the polls and partic-
ipate. However, they will not spend their energy prior to election day encouraging a high
turnout election.
Conclusion
Candidates can change their strategies throughout an election. As the situation dictates,
they can attempt to become more or less visible to voters. They can choose the number of
advertisements they release and the content of them. They can choose to focus on personal
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matters or policy issues. If normal losers becomes more active in elections and start to gain
traction with voters, the normal winners can respond as they see fit.
Normal winners never want to help normal losers to become well recognized and active
in an election. If a normal loser can gain attention independently, as happens in some
elections, the normal winner can do little about it other than change strategy and respond.
If normal winners can control the tone and content of elections, at least to some degree,
the pieces of their campaigns should reveal the strategies they choose to take in an effort
to understand how they attempt to hold back their competitors. Through examining several
aspects of candidates’ strategies, it will be possible to test these theories of limited content
and limited spending empirically in the next three chapters.
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3 VALENCE OVER VALUE: A LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE NET
In 2006, Ohio’s 18th congressional district needed a new representative. Republican
Bob Ney, who had held the seat since 1995, had been implicated in relationship to the Jack
Abramoff lobbying scandal and several Democrats vied for his seat. Ney ran for reelection
initially but dropped out in August, leaving Democrat Zack Space and Republican State
Senator Joy Padgett as the top contenders for the seat.
The election was expected to be close from the beginning. Like much of Ohio, the 18th
district was split nearly in half. The voters had narrowly chosen President Bush over his
opponents in 2000 and 2004 but the Republican name had been tarnished by the actions of
Ney. Additionally, the country as a whole was leaning more Democratic. President Bush’s
approval rating was in decline and the Democrats were pushing to take back the House of
Representatives from the Republicans.
Knowing that the election would be close, Space went on the offensive. He filled his
website with information about his positions on issues. He discussed the need for improv-
ing medical research by using stem cells, saying “This nation can, and should lead the way
in researching this, the most promising medical development we have seen in decades.”
He promoted the “need to provide health care to every American” and outlined his plan
to withdraw troops from Iraq by “transition[ing] our presence from an occupying force to
one consisting primarily of special operations forces” and “building a coalition of nations
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committed to securing the goals of independence, freedom, and democracy in Iraq” (Space
2006).
He also frequently discussed his opponents on his website. When Ney was still attempt-
ing to be reelected, Space linked in an article called “Ney Runs To The Border To Escape
Failures On Illegal Immigration” and explained that voters were ready to “fire” Ney. After
Ney withdrew from the election and was replaced with Padgett, Space linked to the arti-
cle “Ney’s Handpicked Replacement ‘Flattered’ To Be Chosen By Corrupt Congressman.”
Throughout the election season, Space continued to explain his position on issues and why
voters should avoid his opponent (Space 2006). The election was expected to be close.
While many elections can be predicted in advance, polling firms shied away from making a
prediction on the 18th district. For the months leading up to the election, even into Novem-
ber, the race was considered to be a toss-up (Cook Political Report). After using a strategy
in which he openly discussed his positions and ideals, Space ended up winning soundly
with 62% of the vote.
The 2008 election for Space was a bit different. He was an incumbent this time and
Barack Obama was running for the presidency. President Bush’s approval ratings were at
an all time low. Space was likely to maintain his hold on his seat, with projections saying
that he would defeat his Republican opponent (Cook Political Report). Space took a very
different approach to campaigning this time around.
Space’s website was designed completely differently, with one key section missing:
issues. He no longer used his website to explain his position on stem cells or Iraq. In fact,
there was almost no information at all about Space. He still had a news section with links
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to articles but very few provided information about Space as a politician. There was a small
amount of information in the articles, such as that he planned to “attend [an] NRA Banquet
in Zanesville” and his opinion that NAFTA was “irresponsible” but the bulk of the articles
explained that he had been endorsed by groups like seniors and veterans and that he would
provide “sensible leadership” for his district (Space 2008).
The expectations about the outcome of the election were much different in 2008 than
in 2006. Now, Space was considered a normal winner; his election was not expected to be
a close race. He altered his campaign to reflect his change of standing, limiting the amount
of information provided to voters. Rather than discussing positions, he discussed being a
“Friend of [the] Farm Bureau.” His strategy appeared to be much different than two years
prior. In the end, he successfully defeated Republican Fred Dailey by 20% of the vote.
In 2010, Space found himself in an election that was different than the two prior. This
time, the Republicans would have the advantage nation-wide. In his district, with a majority
of voters tending to favor the Republican party, he could face a strong challenge. Early in
the election, his seat was considered leaning Democratic, but that was changed to toss up
about two months before the election (Cook Political Report). While the situation was
different than 2006 because Space was now an incumbent, the outcome was just as much
in question. What would Space’s strategy be this time around?
While the overall format of Space’s website in 2010 was the same as 2008, the informa-
tion within it had changed. The news section was still the best source of information about
the campaign on the website but nearly every article was now dedicated to Space’s oppo-
nent, Bob Gibbs, rather than being about Space himself. Two years earlier, he had focused
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on his own campaign, rather than his opponent. This time, he chose a strategy more like he
had in 2006 and used his website to attack his opponent. He had stories like “New TV ad:
The Gibbs plan for positions he can’t outsource? Fill them with illegal immigrants.” He
claimed “Gibbs’ campaign to deceive voters reaches new low” and “Go-Along Bob Gibbs
chooses: Blind loyalty to party leaders...again!” Nearly half of Space’s stories referred to
his opponent as “Go-Along Bob Gibbs” in the title.
In total, Space included 36 articles that attacked Gibbs for his political views, fundrais-
ing activities, and relationship with the Republican party between August and election day.
In contrast, he included just four articles that focused on his own candidacy; three that
described endorsements he had received from the NRA and veterans groups and a single
article that focused on his vision for American and Ohio which was little more than the text
of a television ad he ran at the end of October. It provided just two paragraphs about his
goals to “transform Southeastern and East Central Ohio” if reelected (Space 2010).
On November 2, 2010, Space was defeated by Gibbs, who received 54% of the vote.
From the beginning, the election was expected to be close. As a result, Space seemed to
take a very different strategy than he had two years earlier. He started his attack on Gibbs
shortly after the Republican primary, much like he had done against his opponents in 2006.
Alternatively, his 2008 focused on his own campaign and goals. Why did he make this
change between the elections? Why did he shift the focus of his campaign efforts? How
might the information on websites like Space’s help to explain the strategy candidates use
throughout their elections?
Zack Space ran in three very different elections. In each, his focus appeared to change,
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based on the information on his website. If normal winners do choose strategies that reflect
their beliefs about their chances of winning, websites could provide a place to examine
the strategy that is used. By looking at their websites, it can be determined whether nor-
mal winners avoid discussing position issues and their opponents in this element of the
campaign and discuss valence issues and personal information instead.
In this chapter, I examine the use of campaign websites to provide information to vot-
ers about the goals and ideals of candidates. These websites are all campaign websites, not
official political websites. Members of Congress, governors, and many other elected repre-
sentatives have official websites that are provided by the national, state, or local government
for the officials to provide information to citizens. Those tend to have standard formats and
the types of information can be limited. While politicians may hope that the information
on such websites attracts voters to their cause, they are limited in their control over the
content. They cannot include campaign information or any other information that exists
outside the official duties of the job. Additionally, only already established politicians have
official websites, making it difficult to judge the strategies of challengers and open seat
candidates. Therefore, only campaign websites, which allow much more discretion by the
candidates, are used.
What value can campaign websites have in a search for candidate strategy? How can
they provide insight into the expectations candidates have about their elections?
Campaign Websites
Examining the strategy of political candidates can be difficult as very few parts of cam-
paigns are completely within their control. When a reporter asks a candidate to respond
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to a question, it can provide a glimpse of the candidate candidly; however, it does not say
much about the overall strategy. When candidates run television advertisements, it shows
a bit about the strategies of candidates; however, the time is usually limited to 30 to 60
seconds and not much can be said during that time. Websites are one of the best places to
look for a complete strategy by the candidates.
One reason websites provide a good explanation of candidates’ strategies is that they
have essentially unlimited space; candidates can choose exactly how much of their message
they want to provide to voters. If they want voters to know pages worth of information
about a topic, they can include all of that information. If they want voters only to know a
little about their thoughts, only that information needs to be included. Candidates can also
post links to outside material, pictures from the campaign trail, and text of speeches that
are not possible in most other outlets. While other campaign materials like television ads
are important to consider, as will be done in Chapter 5, websites provide a more complete
picture of candidates due to the amount of available space.
Second, the material has not been spun by the media. While candidates can link to news
articles on their websites that have been interpreted by reporters, they can choose exactly
which articles to include. The issues and biographies they include are in their own words
(or, often, the words of a campaign staffer that have been approved by the candidate). The
message goes directly to the reader with no middleman interpreting it. Many of the other
parts of campaigns are spun before they reach voters. While the contents of websites can
also be spun and used by the news, the exact text on websites has not been touched by
anyone outside of the campaign, so it reflects the exact views of the candidates.
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Finally, nearly every candidate has a website. Even for local elections, most candidates
create a website to promote their message since the costs are minimal. Many candidates
choose not to send out mailers to voters and others choose not to create television ads
(Kahn & Kenney 1999). Many elections see very little coverage in the media. Using
those materials can therefore be hard to analyze as the strategies of candidates with little
advertising or news coverage cannot be determined. However, campaign websites do not
face these challenges since nearly all candidates create them.
Of course, analyzing campaign strategies based on websites also creates some chal-
lenges. One problem with candidates’ websites is that the average voters does not look
at them. Many voters choose not to research the goals and views of candidates; many of
those who do inquire about the candidates are likely to use information that is provided to
them through the local newspaper or television, not information that requires time spent
searching on the internet. However, candidates know that voters can visit their websites
and prepare the materials in a way that will attract the support of those voters.
Candidates also know that journalists may visit their websites for information. Web-
sites offer quotable material to journalists without the need to conduct formal interviews,
which can be time consuming or difficult to schedule. They provide the exact positions
candidates take on issues, in the candidates’ own words, which makes it easier to identify
those positions to voters. They also provide journalists information about which issues
candidates believe are important in the election. Because websites require minimal effort
on the behalf of journalists and journalists have little time to devote to most elections, they
are likely to use candidates’ websites to make their jobs easier. This allows the information
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candidates publish online to reach well beyond the individuals who actually viewed the
material. Therefore, it is a useful place to look when trying to determine the strategy of
political candidates.
To think a little more about the strategies candidates take in their campaigns, it is im-
portant to consider the potential types of information on candidates’ websites.
Political Issues
Political candidates have the option to discuss as many or as few political issues as they
desire on their websites. Some outline clear plans for their time in office by explaining the
issues that are important to them and the ways they plan to achieve their goals. Mary Bono
Mack, a Republican from California’s 45th congressional district, is one such candidate
who explained her vision very clearly on her 2008 campaign website by taking a position
on energy policy. Her website’s home page included a picture of two children looking at
windmills. Under the picture, the website read,
Congresswoman Mary Bono Mack has a plan to lower fuel costs and reduce
our dependence on foreign oil. Bono Macks comprehensive energy solution
will expand and diversify Americas energy portfolio, creating new American
energy sources and promoting a more secure energy future. This includes in-
creasing domestic exploration of fossil fuels in an environmentally sensitive
manner; bringing more refineries online; expanding clean energy sources like
nuclear power; increasing renewable energies such as wind, solar, and geother-
mal; investing in alternative energy options to power our lives; and encouraging
greater energy efficiency nationwide. Our energy needs will only continue to
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grow, and Bono Macks plan would help meet these needs both now and into
the future, helping keep our economy strong for our children. (Bono Mack
2008)
Mack has clearly explained her views on energy policy and what she would like to
accomplish.
Candidates may also choose to discuss valence issues on their websites. These are
issues with little room to disagree; they include things Americans generally all want. Jon
Huntsman included several valence issues on his website in his reelection campaign for
governor of Utah in 2008. He wrote,
Utahns elected business leader and former United States diplomat Jon Hunts-
man as governor in November 2004. Governor Huntsman is working to breathe
new life into Utah by bolstering economic development, enriching public ed-
ucation, maintaining unparalleled quality of life, and enhancing confidence in
public service. (Hunstman 2008)
He has not told voters anything about how he plans to achieve such goals. What will
he do to increase economic development? How will he pay for the costs associated with
improving the public education system? Voters are left with little information about the
actual positions of Huntsman, only knowing that he has lofty goals. He has provided no
details on how he plans to achieve them.
Candidates have the option to discuss one or both types of issues. Or, they can choose
to discuss neither type of issue. When candidates are trying to attract attention, they may
be more likely to use position issues as they can energize voters and force an opponent to
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respond. However, in the case of a normal winner, the candidate is already ahead. Voters
have largely tuned out the election and decided on their preferred candidate. The election
is not a competitive race, and the normal winner would like to keep it that way. Because of
that, normal winners would be expected to avoid discussing position issues. They have the
potential to alienate voters that would otherwise vote for the candidate. If a voter liked Mary
Bono Mack prior to visiting her website but finds out her views are different than those of
the voter, it may encourage the voter to learn about her challenger. It may also provide
an opening for the challenger to become more visible to voters by publicly discussing the
same issue as Mack, making the election more competitive than it would have otherwise
been. If normal winners have a goal of avoiding competitive races, they are not expected
to discuss position issues when possible.
At the same time, candidates often cannot avoid talking about issues completely. If a
normal winner says nothing about issues, voters may notice and question their beliefs. The
ambiguity may cause voters to question whether the candidate actually stands for anything
since they have no idea of what he or she wants to achieve in office (Shepsle 1972). How-
ever, since valence issues require no position taking and are liked by virtually everyone,
there is no downside to a normal winner discussing such issues. There is no other side of
the issue that voters may prefer that will cause them to switch their support to the normal
loser. These have very little potential to make the election more competitive. Therefore,
when normal winners want to avoid elections becoming more competitive races but feel
compelled to discuss some issues, they are expected to discuss primarily valence issues.
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Personal Information
Many candidates also discuss their personal history, education, family, and careers on
their websites. Jill Long Thompson, Democratic candidate for governor of Indiana in 2008,
discussed some of her background on her website. This included,
Jill Long Thompson, 54, grew up on the family farm outside of Larwill in
Whitley County. She lives with her husband Don Thompson, a commercial
airline pilot, in Marshall County on a farm near Argos. Most recently, Long
Thompson served as CEO and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Food
and Agricultural Policy. Jill Long Thompson was the first in her family to grad-
uate from college. She earned an M.B.A. (1978) and Ph.D (1984) in Business
from Indiana University, and a B.S. in Business from Valparaiso University
(1974). (Long Thompson 2008)
This was just a small portion of the personal information about Thompson on her web-
site, where she also discussed her previous employment and that she is a “fighter for work-
ing families.”
When candidates choose the personal information to include on their websites, they
never choose anything that would offend any voters, even though such information may
exist. Candidates never discuss cheating on their spouses or their addictions to drugs and
alcohol on their website; candidates only focus on the positive information about their
past. Voters would be very unlikely to judge a candidate like Thompson negatively because
of where she went to school or because she is married. Even the biggest Purdue fans
would be unlikely to vote against her because she went to Indiana. There is little chance
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such information could alienate voters or make the election more competitive so there is
no reason to expect that normal winners would avoid discussing their history. Therefore,
normal winners are expected to discuss personal information freely on their websites.
Discussions of Opponent(s) and other Politicians
Candidates can also discuss their opponents and other politicians. Some candidates
choose to include extended information about their opponents on their websites.
Jim Russell, a Republican challenger for the House of Representatives from New York,
frequently discussed his opponent on his 2008 campaign website. He wrote,
For nearly twenty years now, this Congressional District has been represented
by multi-millionaire Nita Lowey, who has voted against immigration con-
trol and in favor of affirmative action. She voted for NAFTA, which has
put millions of American citizens out of work, and she voted to increase the
number of visas for foreign technical workers. Nita Lowey’s policies have
contributed toward the decline of the American middle class while a greedy
global elite profits by equalizing our wages with those of third-world work-
ers.” He continued, “Nita Lowey says that we shouldn’t be dependent on
foreign oil, but yet she co-sponsored the Arctic Wilderness Act which has
prevented any oil exploration or drilling in the vast Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge. No candidate cares more about our environment than I do, but the fact
remains that in 2006 only 6% of America’s domestic energy supply came from
renewable sources, while 58% came from oil and natural gas. We must fo-
cus our national scientific talent to reverse this situation as soon as possible,
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but, although multi-millionaire Lowey might not know it, Americans need re-
lief NOW from the ever-increasing prices of gasoline and home heating oil,
especially during these economic hard times. Therefore, I support the imme-
diate limited and careful utilization of our domestic oil reserves. (Russell
2008, emphasis in original)
While the website does contain some information about Russell’s positions on issues, it
is only in comparison to his opponent. Rather than simply presenting his views to encour-
age voters to choose him, he tells voters both why they should vote for him and why they
should not vote for Lowey.
Similarly, Bill Haas, challenging Todd Akin for a House seat in Missouri in 2008, talked
about the outgoing president. In addition to comparing himself to his opponent, he chose
to compare himself and Akin to President Bush in an attempt to encourage voters to favor
him. His website read,
So if you’re tired of Bush’s politics, tired of GOP politics, and tired of business
as usual in Congress, vote for Bill Haas for US Congress, and help me get
elected by your financial contribution and recommending me to others. You
will be removing one of the most conservative of Bush’s favorite congressmen,
and getting a real good one in return. (Haas 2008)
He hoped that the voters would choose him on the grounds that he would work in
opposition to the policies that were unpopular at the time, though he told voters little other
than that he would be different.
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One other form of a politician talking about his or her opponent comes in the form
of discussing tracking polls or candidates’ chances of winning the election. Bob Lord,
running for Congress in Arizona, included a discussion of the party affiliation of voters on
his 2008 campaign website in the hopes the election would appear to be very close. His
website read,
Congressional District 3’s voter registration numbers have changed substan-
tially since 2006 and are setting the stage for an increasingly competitive race
in November, statistics show. Since October 2006, 71 percent of new voters
in the district registered for a party other than Republican. Only 29 percent of
new voters registered as Republican. The raw numbers show exactly 34,647
new registrants out of a total of 48,499 have chosen to register for any other
party than Republican. (Lord 2008)
Lord was a Democrat challenging a Republican incumbent. He attempted to demon-
strate that the election would be close by explaining that most of the new voters in the
district would support him, rather than the Republican incumbent. He hoped this informa-
tion would help voters to see the election was very close and encourage them to start paying
more attention to both candidates.
Normal losers tend to have nearly no name recognition among voters. Normal winners
are more likely to be known by name by constituents. When a normal winner decides to
discuss his or her opponent, it may lead voters to begin to recognize the name of a candidate
they might otherwise not know. Normal winners would likely avoid bringing attention to
these candidates by choosing not to mention opponents by name. Discussing opponents
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could cause the election to become a more competitive race than it would have been without
the attention. Normal winners are expected to avoid engaging their opponents.
Normal winners also would be expected to avoid discussing other politicians in most
cases. Even popular politicians are disliked by some voters. And unpopular politicians
retain some supporters, even at their lowest approval ratings. By comparing themselves or
their opponents to other politicians, normal winners risk encouraging voters to think about
both candidates differently and assume they hold the views of the mentioned politicians.
If normal winners do compare themselves or their opponents to other politicians, it has
the potential to attract some new voters. However, it also has the potential to cause voters
to dislike them if the voters feel strongly in support or opposition to the other politicians.
That could cause voters to think more positively about the normal loser and, with these new
supporters, the normal loser may become a more competitive opponent. Normal winners
would be expected to avoid such behaviors. When possible, normal winners are predicted
not to discuss other politicians in relation to themselves or their opponents.
Finally, polls remind voters that an election is happening. While the voters may realize
they need to vote soon, they may not think about the fact that there is another candidate
in the election that they need to consider. Even if a poll says that the normal winner is
going to win by a landslide, it could still encourage voters to think about the contest and
remember there is more than one candidate in the election. When voters begin to notice the
other candidate(s) in the election, the election could become more competitive. Therefore,
normal winners are not expected to discuss polls on their websites.
In summary, there are several expectations about the actions of normal winners who
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have the goal of avoiding their elections becoming competitive races. They are expected to
avoid discussing position issues, their opponents, other politicians, and polling information.
However, they are expected to freely discuss valence issues and personal information as
they are unlikely to increase competition in the election.
Data
All of these above expectations are contingent upon candidates controlling the form
of speech. One of the best places to examine expectations about the types of information
candidates discuss when they have complete control of the language is their campaign
websites. Campaign websites are one of the most open forums for candidates to discuss
exactly what they believe their candidacy means for voters.
To analyze websites, images of candidates’ websites from 2008 are used. These web-
sites are available from the Library of Congress and archive.org’s Wayback Machine. These
two organizations have archived millions of websites by taking “snapshots,” which are pic-
tures of websites, over the last decade. These snapshots are taken of websites regularly; the
Wayback Machine takes snapshots of many news websites close to once an hour. Almost
all national political candidates’ websites are available from one or both of these sources.
For this analysis, nearly all candidates’ websites for the House of Representatives, Senate,
and governorships are included. In most cases, snapshots of candidates’ websites are taken
about once a week in the months leading up to an election. By September, campaigns are
in full swing and nearly all candidates have websites that display the strategy that they are
taking. Therefore, the first available snapshot after September 1 is used.
There are a few websites not included in these analyses. Only elections in which both a
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Democrat and a Republican were running were used; where there is no candidate from one
of the major parties, the strategy of normal winners may be a little different than elections
with both. While there may be a third party candidate in these elections, a major party
candidate’s risk of losing the election is even lower when only competing against third
party candidates so they may not be as concerned with sticking to the strategy of avoiding
controversial issues. While normal winners are extremely likely to win, there is always a
risk that voters could turn on them; that risk is much diminished when only one of the major
parties has a candidate in the election. All third party candidates are also excluded because
not a single third party candidate was successful in the 2008 election nor was any even
in close contention. The most successful third party candidate did not receive even 25%
of the vote total, making all third party candidates normal losers. Additionally, the theory
outlined rests on the assumption that all candidates want to win their elections. However,
this may not always be true for third party candidates, who may have other goals in mind
(Canon 1993), so they are not used to this analysis.
There are a few elections that had a candidate from both major parties that have been
left out of the dataset because one of the websites was not available through either of the
sources. In almost all cases, the normal loser, despite being a major party candidate, lost so
badly that snapshots were never taken of his or her website or no website was ever created.
For example, Charles Hargrave’s website was not accessible from the Library of Congress
or the Wayback Machine. The Republican in California’s 9th congressional district earned
less than 10% of the vote in 2008.
This leaves 352 elections for the House of Representatives, 29 Senate elections, and 9
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gubernatorial elections for a total of 780 candidates, half of which are Democrats and half
are Republicans.
While candidates’ websites can vary, they have some similarities. The homepage, or
the first screen of the website, tends to have the overall message that candidates want to
provide to voters. For some, candidates provide information about their political views,
opinions, and why to avoid their opponents. Such is the case for Bill Sali’s website, which
is shown in Figure 3.1. Sali was the representative from the First District of Idaho in 2008
and was running for reelection. Almost half of the website is dedicated to discussing Walt
Minnick, Sali’s opponent. This includes a link to the website TheTruthAboutWalt.com,
which was created by the Sali campaign, and the claim that Minnick is “to blame for high
gas prices.” He also discusses position issues such as the support of “English as the official
language of the United States” and his support for the “repeal of the onerous estate/death
tax.” He seems to clearly want voters to know his views about his opponent and his policy
goals more than anything else.
Alternatively, Figure 3.2 is the website of Marcy Kaptur, a veteran of the House of
Representatives since 1983, when she was running for reelection in 2008. She does not
mention a single position issue on her front page. Instead, she focuses on her desire to
promote the “freedom to be independent” and the “freedom of opportunity and of work”
with no explanation about how she plans to achieve these goals. She wants to “ensure
affordable education” and “forge a health care system that works for all Ohioans.” She
tells voters they “can count on [her]” and references our founding fathers, saying she will
“protect the freedoms our forefathers so bravely secured” but never mentions her opponent.
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Rather than discuss her goals for her next term if she is reelected, she focuses on lofty issues
that she provides no information about how to achieve.
Most candidates’ websites, including these two, have a link that provides viewers more
information about the lives of the candidates. These are titled “About Bill Sali” and “Meet
Marcy” on the websites in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. These links generally tell voters of the
education, families, and experiences of the candidates. While the specifics are different,
nearly all candidates provide some information about their lives outside of running for
Congress.
There is also usually a link that provides observers information about the policy ideals
of candidates. Both Sali and Kaptur included such a link, titled “Issues” and “Agenda,”
respectively. There can be variation among these links because candidates have the option
to choose the number and depth of their discussion of issues. Some candidates choose
to discuss just a single issue while others discuss a dozen different policy goals. Some
candidates provide just a few sentences about each issues while others provide paragraphs.
Many websites have additional links that can provide voters more information about
themselves and their opponents. Some link to news articles, provide pictures, or explain
how to get involved in the campaign. Some even blog on the campaign trail, telling vot-
ers about their experiences. Depending on the goals of the candidate, there can be wide
variation in the content throughout these websites.
From each website, all content and pictures were coded. For this study, the most impor-
tant codes were for the any issues that were discussed, personal information, any discus-
sions of candidates’ opponents, any other politicians, and any information about polling.
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For each website, the number of times candidates discussed each of these things was tal-
lied. All of this coding was done manually as a computer would not be able to distinguish
some of the information. For example, many candidates discussed energy policies. Some,
like Mary Bono Mack, outlined their plans very clearly, explaining exactly how to go about
“reduc[ing] our dependence on foreign oil” and “promoting a more secure energy future.”
These explanations would be coded as position issues; specific goals are included and she
discusses how to achieve these goals. However, many candidates stated they had similar
goals but provided no information about how they would achieve them. Those instances
were coded as valence issues. Allowing a computer to code this information would not dis-
tinguish between these very different types of information. A more thorough explanation
of coding procedures is available in Appendix A.
While the information throughout the website is important to examine, it is also clear
that candidates choose the information for their homepages very carefully. For some, the
first page will contain detailed information about their hopes and plans for their time in
office. For others, the front screen tells voters how much candidates care about them with
very little explanation about what they intend to do in office. Candidates seem to make
strategic decisions about the full content on their websites as well as the message displayed
on page one. This creates two different ways to examine the theories regarding the content
of websites: the overall message throughout the website and the information chosen to be
displayed on the homepage.
The Cook Political Report is used to determine which candidates are normal winners.
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The Cook Political Report is “an independent, non-partisan newsletter that analyzes elec-
tions and campaigns for the US House of Representatives, US Senate, Governors and Presi-
dent as well as American political trends.” It rates elections based on how likely candidates
are to win. Cook categorizes contests as “Solid Democrat/Republican,” “Likely Demo-
crat/Republican,” “Lean Democrat/Republican,” or ”Toss Up.” In elections where one can-
didate is expected to solidly win, the likely victor is considered to be a normal winner.
Their opponents, who have little to no chance of victory, are normal losers. In elections
that are likely, leaning, or toss ups, the candidates are considered to be in competitive races.
Throughout the election, Cook periodically revises their predictions about the outcome
of elections. The first report Cook released in September of 2008 was used to determine
which candidates are normal winners. By this point in the election, the candidates know the
identities of their opponents and have fully devised their strategies. It is also close to the
same date as the snapshots of the websites, since the first snapshot of candidates’ websites
by the Library of Congress or the Wayback Machine in September was used (or, in a few
cases, October if none were taken in September).
Results
The first expectation was that normal winners would be unlikely to discuss position
issues throughout their websites. The results of a comparison between the number of issues
discussed by type of candidate is in Table 3.1. On average, normal winners discuss just
1.76 position issues on their websites, compared to 3.89 position issues discussed by other
candidates. In fact, 23% normal winners never discussed a single position issue on their
entire websites.
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Normal winners appear to discuss their political views and other controversial political
information much less frequently than other candidates. They shy away from openly ex-
plaining their goals and how they hope to achieve them. This type of information can gain
votes from the party base, but also has the possibility of alienating some voters that would
have otherwise chosen the normal winner. Therefore, they avoid bringing this information
to the attention of the voters.
The second expectation was that normal winners, if they did discuss issues, would only
discuss valence issues. Nearly all normal winners discussed at least one valence issue, with
the average normal winner discussing 4.13 valence issues throughout his or her website,
which is an average of .76 fewer valence issues than other candidates, as shown in Table
3.1. While this difference is statistically significant, both types of candidates frequently tell
voters that they support job creation and freedom without explaining themselves with each
averaging more than four valence issues. The difference is that normal winners explain
their views on almost no issues at all; other candidates at least discuss some position issues
in addition to these valence issues.
There is also little difference in the frequency with which normal winners and other
candidates discuss their personal lives and history, as expected. Normal winners, as well as
other candidates, openly discuss their experiences and lives prior to running for Congress.
There is little difference between the number of these discussions on normal winners’ web-
sites versus other types of candidates.
The next expectation was that normal winners would avoid engaging their opponents.
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Normal winners are not expected to mention their opponents by name or even as “my op-
ponent.” The differences between the number of times opponents are mentioned by type
of candidate are also in Table 3.1. This is one of the strongest differences between the dif-
ferent types of candidates. Whereas only 34% normal winners mentioned their opponent,
72% of other candidates mentioned theirs at least once. Among candidates not expected to
win their elections, opponents were mentioned an average of 2.77 times, whereas normal
winners averaged just 0.68 opponent mentions each.
Normal winners were also expected to avoid discussing polling information. After ex-
amining the websites, it became clear that very few candidates discuss polls, regardless
of probability of winning. So, while normal winners discuss polling less than other can-
didates, the differences are not statistically significant as this content is rare throughout
websites.
Candidates for office can mention other politicians, as well. They have the option of
talking about the president, a governor or member of Congress who is not their opponent, or
anyone else who holds or has held a political office. I expected that normal winners would
avoid mentioning all politicians, not just their opponents. This prediction is confirmed in
Table 3.1. Again, there is strong evidence that normal winners take a strategy different than
other candidates. Less than 20% of normal winners in 2008 discussed any other politician
on their website. Alternatively, about 70% of normal losers mentioned another politician
at some point on their website.
To look more deeply at the findings, I examined this same data using a multivariate
analysis. This allows me to ensure that the findings hold when controlling for other possible
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causes of the dependent variables. The reason for using the negative binomial distribution
is that it works well with a dependent variable which is a count of occurrences, many of
which are zero, like with this data.
The results of the multivariate analysis are in Table 3.2. The analysis contains dummy
variables for candidates who are Democrats, running for the Senate, and for governor. A
normal winner is anyone who was considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report.
The results of the regression have been converted to incidence rate ratios for easier
interpretation. All else equal, for every time a non-normal winner discusses a position
issue, a normal winner will discuss just .42 position issues, a difference which is statistically
significant. In addition, normal winners discuss their opponents significantly less, with just
.57 opponent mentions for every mention by other types of candidates. Normal winners
discuss other politicians less frequently than other candidates, with just .39 mentions for
every mention by other candidates. And, normal winners discuss polls less frequently, with
.18 mentions for every mention by other candidates.
These differences are not shown with valence issues and personal information where
the differences are not statistically significant. For these types of issues, normal winners
act similarly to other types of candidates.
Each of these findings are as expected. Normal winners discuss controversial informa-
tion on their websites much less than other candidates while continuing to discuss valence
issues, which have no other side, and personal information.
These findings become even more pronounced when looking at just the homepage of
candidates. The same difference of means analyses, but just for the text of the homepage
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of websites, are in Table 3.3. If candidates want to emphasize certain aspects of their
campaigns, it is likely they will include those messages front and center, as the first thing
visitors to their website will see. Other information that does not have the same level of
importance may be left off the front screen.
As with the full websites, normal winners discuss fewer position issues on their home-
pages than other candidates, averaging just .54 position issues per candidate. Other candi-
dates are more likely to include these pieces of information as one of the first things they
want voters who visit the site to notice. Normal winners also include fewer valence issues
on their homepages than other candidates, though they discuss at least one on average.
Normal winners appear to want their primary message to voters to be as noncontroversial
as possible. The front page of a candidate’s website is the first thing any voters will see
when visiting the site. They will learn almost nothing about normal winners in this first
impression.
The same is true for the discussion of opponents and other politicians. Normal winners
rarely discuss anyone other than themselves on their homepages. While many other candi-
dates do mention their opponents at least once on the first page, normal winners rarely do.
Voters rarely know much about normal losers and they will not learn any new information
from these pages. Normal winners tend to leave this information off of their homepages,
thereby presenting a first impression to voters that focuses on their own candidacy.
Table 3.4 shows incidence rate ratios derived from a regression analysis of this data us-
ing the negative binomial distribution, like Table 3.2, but is limited to only the homepage of
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the website. The findings are similar to those for the full websites. For each time other can-
didates discussed position issues, normal winners did just .47 times. They discussed their
opponents just .10 times for each time other candidates mentioned their opponents. Other
politicians were discussed .19 times for each mention by other types of candidates and
polls were discussed just .18 times for each mentions by others. Each of these differences
was significant. Like the full website analysis, the front pages of the websites showed little
difference between normal winners and others for valence issues and personal information,
with no significant differences.
Overall, normal winners provide very little information to voters on their websites.
They do not provide in depth discussions of their political goals or views on issues. They
do not compare themselves to their opponents. They focus on staying non-controversial
and avoiding any subject matter that has the potential to increase the competition in the
election.
Conclusion
Campaign websites provide candidates an easy way to display the things they care about
in elections. Candidates can discuss as many or as few things on their websites given the
nearly unlimited space provided. What do these websites contain?
Normal winners tend to provide some, but not too much, information. They keep the
focus of their websites on their own views, not on those of their opponents. And, the views
they tend to discuss contain very little information about their political beliefs. While
other candidates readily discuss their opponents and their goals if elected, normal winners
provide almost nothing about what they hope to achieve in office. Instead, they opt to
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focus on positive, non-confrontational information. While normal winners’ websites often
contain at least one position issue that tells voters their views and how to achieve their
goals, they are not front and center. Visitors to these websites must click on the right
links to access the information, whereas other candidates are much more likely to keep that
information visible as soon as voters look at their websites.
It seems Zack Space, when running for election in Ohio, was simply following the
patterns of most candidates in his position. In 2006, when the victory in the election could
go to either candidate, Space went on the attack. He discussed his opponent frequently
and told voters about his views. He explained what his priorities would be if chosen to
represent his district. This is similar to other competitive candidates, who tend to explain
their views to voters and criticize their opponents. This can attract voters to their side and
draw attention to a close battle.
In 2008, the election was much different, as was Representative Space’s website. As
an expected winner this time, he provided very little information to voters. Visitors to his
website would not learn the name of his opponent this time, nor would they learn much
about his views and beliefs. They would only learn that he was the preferred candidate
of seniors and veterans. Again, this is in line with other candidates like Space. Expected
winners tend to focus on themselves and provide less information to voters than candidates
in closer races.
Space changed his strategy in 2010. As a candidate in a close race, he went on the
offensive. He knew that his district tended to lean Republican and the country as a whole
was following suit that year. Space, a Democrat, knew he would need to fight if he had
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any hope of keeping his seat. He dedicated his website to attacking his opponent rather
than promoting himself and explained why his opponent’s policy goals would be harmful
to America. This strategy was more like what he had done in 2006, when he was also in
an unpredictable election. As a candidate in a competitive race, Space used very different
tactics than he had in 2008.
Zack Space is not a unique candidate. He reacted to his circumstances, as do all can-
didates. When he was a normal winner, he avoided confrontation. Nothing on his website
could be considered controversial or had the potential to alienate voters. In choosing this
information to be the focus of his campaign, he avoided the attention of the voters and
avoided his election becoming a competitive race. In looking at all of the available web-
sites from the 2008 congressional and gubernatorial elections, it became clear that this was
the most common strategy chosen by normal winners. They do whatever they can to win
their seats and do it without the election even being competitive.
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Figure 3.1: Bill Sali’s 2008 Website
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Figure 3.2: Marcy Kaptur’s 2008 Website
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Table 3.1: Average Difference in Overall Website Content, by Candidate Type
Position Valence Personal Opponent Other Polling N
Issues Issues Information Mentions Politicians Information
Normal 1.76 4.13 7.34 0.68 0.30 0.06 245
Winners (1.36) (4.79) (4.68) (0.27) (0.64) (0.43)
Other 3.89 4.89 7.62 2.77 1.33 0.15 535
Candidates (3.10) (2.97) (4.48) (1.84) (1.29) (0.44)
t 10.31 2.71 0.80 17.69 11.85 2.67
p(T < t) 0.000 0.007 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.008
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Coefficients are
average number of times each type of information was discussed for each type of candidate through
full website. Standard deviations in parentheses. T-values are calculated using a difference of means
test.
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Table 3.2: Types of Issues Discussed through Full Website
Position Valence Personal Opponent Other Polling
Issues Issues Information Mentions Politicians Information
Normal Winner 0.42 0.76 1.20 0.57 0.39 0.18
(2.15) (1.01) (1.26) (3.50) (2.30) (1.87)
Democrat 0.76 0.61 1.22 1.28 1.18 0.84
(0.98) (0.32) (1.98) (0.19) (2.16) (0.09)
Senate 1.21 1.11 1.06 0.97 0.90 0.20
(1.83) (0.27) (0.09) (0.06) (0.20) (0.48)
Governor 1.10 1.14 1.23 1.02 0.95 2.07
(1.81) (0.84) (1.05) (0.67) (0.07) (0.99)
Coefficients are incidence rate ratios calculated using regression with negative binomial distribution.
Z-values in parentheses. Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political
Report. All other candidates are in the baseline category.
53
Table 3.3: Average Difference in Homepage Content, by Candidate Type
Position Valence Personal Opponent Other Polling N
Issues Issues Information Mentions Politicians Information
Normal 0.54 1.09 2.33 0.08 0.35 0.00 245
Winners (1.03) (1.89) (1.78) (0.41) (0.61) (0.00)
Other 1.24 1.31 2.41 1.08 0.62 0.014 535
Candidates (1.76) (1.49) (2.03) (0.97) (1.00) (0.19)
t 5.79 1.75 0.53 15.51 3.91 1.15
p(T < t) 0.000 0.080 0.596 0.000 0.000 0.249
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Coefficients are
average number of times each type of information was discussed for each type of candidate through
full website. Standard deviations in parentheses. T-values are calculated using a difference of means
test.
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Table 3.4: Types of Issues Discussed on Homepage
Position Valence Personal Opponent Other Polling
Issues Issues Information Mentions Politicians Information
Normal Winner 0.47 0.75 0.72 0.10 0.19 0.18
(3.02) (1.84) (1.00) (6.45) (1.99) (1.53)
Democrat 1.20 1.78 1.38 0.76 0.83 0.72
(0.68) (1.29) (0.45) (0.48) (0.55) (0.82)
Senate 2.27 1.28 1.14 1.26 1.07 1.20
(1.30) (0.46) (0.55) (0.66) (0.31) (1.02)
Governor 1.92 2.49 1.93 0.96 1.13 0.79
(0.81) (3.39) (2.19) (0.07) (1.00) (0.49)
Coefficients are incidence rate ratios calculated using regression with negative binomial distribution.
Z-values in parentheses. Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political
Report. All other candidates are in the baseline category.
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4 THE STRATEGY OF LIMITED SPENDING
Campaign spending is on the rise. In both 2010 and 2012, over $3 billion was spent
by candidates, parties, and interest groups for congressional elections. Some candidates
seemed to have unlimited funds to use for unlimited advertising and campaign events. But
many candidates choose to limit their spending rather than emptying their bank accounts.
Richard Shelby ran for reelection for the Senate in Alabama in 2010. He had been in
office since 1987; it was his fifth time seeking election. Because he had been in office for
so many terms and had previously chosen not to spend all of his money, he began the 2010
election season with more than $13 million on hand. Over the election season, he raised
more than $5 million to add to it, making his total war chest about $18.5 million. Of that,
he spent just $1.5 million dollars, or about 8% of his campaign’s total worth, and saved the
other $17 million for the next election cycle (The Center for Responsive Politics). While
Shelby saved more money in 2010 than any other candidate, his behavior is not out of the
ordinary. Many candidates choose to spend only a portion of their cash and save the rest
for later.
Why would a candidate choose to keep so much money and spend so little of it? Shelby
won with about 65% of the vote in 2010. If he had spent a little more, maybe he could have
secured a higher margin over his opponent. This would not have changed the outcome
of the election, as he won handily, but it could have helped him gain confidence prior to
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election day. Similarly to Shelby, Gary Miller of California spent only about 25% of his
funds in 2008 (The Center for Responsive Politics); he won with about 60% of the vote.
Again, this was still a large margin, but he did not win as soundly as many candidates. He
ended the election cycle with more money on hand than he had when the election season
started. Why would candidates make the choice to spend so little? Could spending more
improve their margin of victory? Why would Miller campaign so little, choosing to limit
the number of advertisements and events, when campaigning more could have potentially
increased his confidence that he would surely win the election?
Like candidates’ campaign websites, spending patterns may provide some insight into
the strategies that candidates take when running for office. By looking at the total amount
of money that candidates spend, the amount of money they leave for their future elections,
and the specific places that candidates spend money, it can be determined whether these
demonstrate the same findings as Chapter 3: that normal winners choose to avoid attention
to their campaigns.
In this chapter, I will look at the amount of spending by candidates based on the expec-
tations of whether they will win or lose their elections. I find that some candidates make the
choice to spend less than what is available. Candidates who are expected to win elections,
normal winners, choose to spend only a portion of what is available while other candidates,
normal losers and those in close races, spend nearly every penny. I will begin by examining
the different types of elections and candidates. I conclude that candidates expected to win
their elections make a conscious choice to limit campaign spending with the belief that it
is better for their campaigns to do so. The primary reason normal winners avoid higher
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campaign spending is to avoid a visible campaign.
Limits to Candidate Spending
Candidate spending can vary widely by candidate, office, and year but there are many
patterns in spending. One of the most widely cited studies of candidate spending is that
of Gary Jacobson (2004). Jacobson finds that incumbents who spend more money actually
do worse than incumbents who spend less. This is because incumbents in close elections,
particularly incumbents with strong challengers, spend money reactively. If a strong chal-
lenger starts spending large sums of money and attracting attention, the incumbent will also
start spending a lot of money as a means to fight back. When competitive challengers do
not enter the race, incumbents refrain from spending so much money.
However, this account really only explains the actions of the candidates in close races. It
theorizes why challenged candidates spend a lot of money. However, Jacobson does little to
explain the actions of candidates who are expected to win their elections. He acknowledges
that expected winners do refrain from spending but does not clearly explain the reasons,
though he briefly posits an explanation, discussed below. If normal winners spend less than
challenged candidates in close races, what are the possible explanations of why normal
winners spend the way they do? What might explain why normal winners choose to limit
their campaign spending?
Fundraising
Most incumbents running for reelection have a challenger from the opposing major
party; why would they choose to campaign very little against major party opponents? Ja-
cobson’s explanation is that safe incumbents do not want to raise money if they do not have
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to. He says, “Most members of Congress do not particularly enjoy asking for money, and
many avoid doing so if they do not see a pressing need for it” (2004). In other words, if
incumbents could raise and spend millions when challenged in a tight race, they probably
are capable of doing the same in other years when they do not have strong opponents, as
well. However, they choose not to raise the money in those years because they prefer not
to constantly beg for cash.
On the surface, Jacobson’s reasoning seems plausible. Constantly begging friends for
money seems like one of the least desirable parts of holding a political office. If a dislike
of raising money is the reason in which incumbents do not spend money when not involved
in “races,” that would imply that candidates would spend more money if they had more
money but the effort that would be required to raise millions of dollars from voters would
not be worth the benefit.
If candidates do not want to ask their friends for money, they also have the ability to
raise money from interest groups. However, to attract this money, candidates would likely
have to adopt policy positions in line with the positions of the interest group. Then, that
money could be used to attract undecided voters but could also possibly alienate informed
voters who vote based on those policy positions that are now public as a result of the interest
group funding. Candidates have to consider the trade off of stating policy positions to raise
funds and the possible loss of votes from informed voters as a result of the position (Baron
1994). Since normal winners are less concerned with gaining votes than other candidates
because they are already expected to win their elections, this interest group money may not
be as important to them as it would be for other candidates and they may choose to avoid
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asking for it.
If normal winner incumbents are raising much less money than incumbents in close
races but still spending all of their funds, fundraising can be considered the explanation
for the lack of spending by these candidates. If this theory is correct, normal winners will
spend as much as they can without having to ask for additional funds.
War Chests
One of the other common explanations for the way incumbents think about campaign
spending is that they want to keep a war chest. Because incumbents can carry money over
from one election to the next, they have the ability to save their money for a rainy day. This
offers them several potential advantages.
First, war chests are commonly believed to ward off quality challengers. If a challenger,
who is facing an uphill battle by the nature of being a challenger, sees that the incumbent
has a million dollars in the bank, it may convince him or her to avoid the election entirely.
The challenger may realize that the amount of money required to even be competitive
with such a well financed candidate would be nearly impossible to raise, therefore making
the decision that entering the election is not worth it (Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baum-
gartner 1986, Goidel and Gross 1994, Hersch and McDougall 1994, Box-Steffensmeier
1996, Hogan 2001). While some disagree with the validity of the deterrent effect of war
chests (Krasno and Green 1988, Squire 1991, Milyo 1998, Milyo and Groseclose 1999, An-
solabehere and Snyder 2000, Goodliffe 2001), any candidate who believes that war chests
can prevent strong opponents may choose to keep money saved in the bank.
The second potential advantage offered to incumbents with large war chests is that they
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have money available if they need it. There may come a day when, regardless of the size of
the war chest, a strong challenger will enter the election. At that point, the incumbent can
swiftly attack the challenger, airing television advertisements and contacting constituents as
necessary. Without the war chest, the incumbent would need to spend time raising money
before the actual campaigning can begin. Having money in the bank from the beginning
allows the incumbent to skip this step, making it easier to progress through the election
season (Sorauf 1988, Goodliffe 2004).
If candidates fear future challengers and hope to make future elections as easy to win as
possible, they may save money across election years, which requires candidates to refrain
from spending in elections without strong challengers. If these candidates save large por-
tions of their funds at the end of an election cycle, the desire to keep a war chest is likely
the explanation for their actions.
Expenditures
Candidates may make spending decisions based on their lack of desire to raise money
or the potential benefits they receive from a war chest. They may also make decisions based
on where they intend to spend money during the election. That is, candidates may spend
as much money as it costs to buy all of the things they want and then stop spending. Some
candidates will spend every dollar they have to pay for the needs of the campaign. Other
candidates may simply spend what they need to spend and save the rest. An examination of
where candidates spend their money during their elections may also provide some insight
as to why expected winners tend to spend less than their struggling counterparts.
One important use of campaign funds is a campaign staff. Anyone running for office
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needs some assistance in creating a plan to help him or her win the desired seat. Nearly all
candidates hire at least one employee and have one campaign office that must be paid for
throughout the election.
There are also many logistical costs for campaigns. They must pay for campaign of-
fices, electricity, furniture, and office products.
Most candidates spend time traveling prior to election day. Especially for candidates
running for statewide offices or those with large electoral areas, the costs of vehicles and
gas can be high. In addition, costs such as dry-cleaning and hotels while on the road can
be quite expensive for some candidates.
Candidates also host events. Some of the events are for the purpose of attracting voters
and “selling” themselves to the people. Such events might require costs associated with
renting facilities and providing food.
A second type of event might be for the purpose of raising money. Similarly, events
for the purpose of raising funds might require candidates to spend a lot of money, though
of course the goal is much different. Along with fundraising events, candidates may spend
money in other ways with the goal of gaining donations, such as mailings or telemarketing.
Some candidates are willing to give some of their funds to other candidates, political
parties, or committees. In 2012, John Boehner donated more than any other candidate,
giving close to $12 million to the National Republican Congressional Committee, as well
as additional money to the Ohio Republican Party and individual candidates (Center for
Responsive Politics). Most of that money either went directly to other candidates or was
used by the party on their behalf.
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The biggest expense for many candidates is advertising. This may include television,
radio, print, and internet advertising. When candidates want to gain more votes across a
wider audience than events can achieve, they may turn to this type of self promotion. Over
the course of a campaign, some candidates spend millions of dollars on advertising.
On each of these different types of expenses, there can be wide variation in the amount
of money spent. Where might normal winners spend less than other candidates? Could
any types of spending by normal winners increase the risk of elections becoming more
competitive?
There may be some variation in the amount of money that is spent on a campaign staff,
offices, and office supplies. A candidate in a close race would likely hire the best campaign
staff that money can buy. However, it may be the case that an incumbent normal winner
will also hire the best staff possible because many of those hiring decisions happen months
or even years in advance of the election. Many politicians even keep the same campaign
managers across elections to ensure they have the best staff available if a strong challenge
does occur. Candidates may fear that spending too little in this area could result in mistakes
being made and a closer election than would have occurred with a better staff. There may
also be variation in the cost of campaign office space and travel, though they are almost
certainly much more closely tied to the type of district (New York City vs. Wyoming-at-
large) than the expectations of winning. While normal winners may spend less on these
costs than candidates in competitive elections, this is unlikely to account for more than a
small portion of any differences in total expenses between the two. For most administrative
costs of a campaign, normal winners are unlikely to spend significantly less money than
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competitive candidates, which means this will not account for the differences between the
spending for these different types of candidates.
Additionally, some candidates spend a lot of time and effort on campaign events, pro-
motional materials, and mailings. If the goal is to attract more voters, there is an expectation
that candidates in competitive races would spend more money on such activities than nor-
mal winners since competitive candidates are more in need of support. There are a couple
possible reasons why candidates might choose to spend the money or abstain from such
campaign activities. It is possible that candidates believe that such events and materials
will help them gain enough votes to make the spending worth the money. That is, they will
make a calculated decision that the money will earn them enough votes to help win the
election. Even among normal winners, candidates may believe that campaign events will
help their cause enough to continue to hold them, despite their likely success without them.
Alternatively, candidates may believe that the money either does not produce any new votes
or that the small increase in votes would not offset the costs of the events and materials.
Some candidates may even believe that additional events and materials could cause a loss
of votes, particularly if they are forced to discuss position issues. If they are forced to take
positions during events and those positions are broadcast to voters, it has the potential to
alienate some voters and increase in the competitiveness of the election. If normal winners
spend much less money than candidates in competitive elections on events and materials,
this will provide evidence that they believe they are unlikely to gain votes from the events
and materials or could lose some support.
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Candidates may also spend money on advertising in an attempt to market their cam-
paigns, including, but not limited to, television, radio, and internet advertising. Similarly,
candidates could believe that the use of media has the potential to gain more votes, not gain
votes or lose votes, or could cost some votes.
Normal winners may calculate that advertising through events or media could increase
their share of the votes. After all, some researchers have found that advertising increases
the portion of the vote candidates receive, even for incumbents without strong challengers
(Gerber 1998, Partin 2002, Green and Krasno 1988, 1990). But, they are already expected
to win the election. Therefore, normal winners may believe that, even if they can increase
the number of votes received with such practices, it may not be enough to make it “worth
it.” Others have found that such spending could result in little change in vote totals for
incumbents (Glanz, Abramowitz, and Burkart 1976, Jacobson 1978, 1980, 2004, Bardwell
2005), and candidates who believe that may choose to abstain from much advertising as it
will not change their vote total. However, normal winners may also fear that advertising has
the potential to lose votes than other candidates, and some studies (Thomas 1990, Coates
1998) have shown instances where incumbents who spent too much money on advertising
have lost votes as a result. Advertising can draw more attention to the election than would
have otherwise been paid and make the election more competitive, which normal winners
want to avoid. If normal winners advertise much less than other candidates, it would pro-
vide evidence that they believe advertising has the potential to increase the competitiveness
of the election or, at the very least, that it will not help to ensure victory.
Another cost to campaigns is fundraising. Nearly all candidates spend some money
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in the hope that it will pay off with more money than was spent. However, as discussed
earlier, normal winners may choose to avoid asking for money due to the dislike of begging
friends for cash. If normal winners spend less money than competitive candidates for the
purpose of raising additional funds, this would lend support to Jacobson’s expectations
that the reason incumbents without strong challengers spend little is because of a dislike
of fundraising (2004). However, if the amount of money normal winners spend raising
funds is comparable to competitive candidates, this would imply that some other factor
discourages spending among normal winners.
Finally, candidates may give money to other campaigns, parties, and committees. If
the goal of normal winners is to keep a war chest, it is unlikely that they will give money
away to other candidates. If normal winners frequently give money away, it diminishes the
amount of funds for future elections, and would imply that the war chest theory above is
not the primary motivation for normal winners’ spending patterns.
Additionally, if normal winners are primarily motivated by a lack of desire to raise
funds in each election, they would also be unlikely to give money away. Each dollar given
to other candidates means a dollar the candidate will have to raise in the next election
cycle. If normal winners donate large sums of money to others, this would also imply that
candidates are not primarily motivated by a lack of desire to raise funds, since it forces
them to do so in the future.
However, if normal winners do donate large sums of money, it would lend credence to
the idea that they spend the amount of money they want to and then refrain from spending
any more. If normal winners would rather see other candidates use their money than use
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it on their own campaigns, it supports the theory that they have calculated the amount
of money they want to spend and will not spend beyond it. They want to avoid making
the election more prominent and spending more money to advertise and campaign more
forcefully would do so, which could increase the competitiveness of the campaign.
Expectations
These three competing theories can be examined to determine which is most likely to
predict the behavior of normal winners. Based on the theories, there are several expecta-
tions that need to be met for each to be supported by the data.
For the theory that normal winners want to avoid raising funds to be correct, they would
be expected to raise less funds than other candidates. They would also avoid giving money
to other candidates at the conclusion of the election if they meet the expectations of this
theory, as giving money away requires them to raise more in the future, which they dislike.
If the theory of war chests is the most accurate, normal winners would be unlikely to
donate money at the end of the election, as well. If normal winners have the option to keep
a large war chest but give half of it away instead, they must not be primarily motivated by
a desire to have money in the bank.
Normal winners may also have made the decision to spend a certain amount and then
stop spending money. In this theory, they have decided that additional money spent would
either earn them no new votes or potentially lose some. For this to be correct, normal
winners spend much less throughout the campaign on things like advertising than other
candidates. They would be willing to give away money they do not want to use during the
election to other candidates.
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Data and Methods
In every election, the Federal Election Commission compiles a database of all funds
raised and expenditures throughout federal elections. This can be used to examine the
questions regarding total money raised, cash on hand prior to the elections, and total money
spent. All candidates are required to report all money that comes in or out of their cam-
paign. The Center for Responsive Politics takes this information and codes the expenditures
based on the purpose for which it was used.
There is a total of 1,803 candidates whose spending has been compiled by the FEC
from the 2008 and 2010 elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate. This
included 85 candidates with no challenger from the opposing major party, who will not
be used in the analysis since their strategies are likely quite different than candidates with
challengers. Third party candidates are also not included because their strategies may also
be quite different. That leaves total of 1,718 candidates to be used for this analysis, half
Democrats and half Republicans. A total of 765 of the elections included an incumbent
running for reelection while 94 were elections for open seats. A total of 1,608 candidates
were running for the House while 110 were running for the Senate.
From the Center for Responsive Politics, the sample is more limited. Because of the
poor quality of the reporting from some candidates as well as the lack of information for
many losing candidates, data was available for 541 of the 2008 and 2010 House candidates.
While there was information available for fewer than 20 Senate candidates, they were not
included in this analysis since the numbers were so small.
To examine the amount of money that each candidate had available to spend in a given
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year, the amount of money raised in that election cycle was added to the amount of money
left from previous election cycles, if there was any. Many incumbents running for reelection
have money saved from a previous election cycle that could be used. Dividing the total
expenditures of candidates by their total funds available provided the percentage spent for
every candidate. In some cases, the percentages were over 100 when candidates overspent
their savings and required a loan to pay for the expenditures. There were 37 candidates
with a percentage over 100.
The Cook Political Report was used to determine which candidates are normal winners,
normal losers, and candidates in competitive races, as in Chapter 3. The results that are
reported are using the first Cook Political Report from September of the election year, when
candidates have fully formed strategies and have clear expectations about the outcome of
the election. Out of the 1,718 candidates, 617 of them were normal winners, described by
Cook as “solid.” There were also 617 normal losers, since all candidates in the sample had
an opponent. There were also 484 candidates in close races, which were in elections that
were not solidly in the favor of one candidate.
Of the candidates available from the Center for Responsive Politics’ coding, 432 can-
didates were considered normal winners, using the Cook Political Report. There were 136
candidates considered to be in close races and 123 normal losers.
Results
Before analyzing specific places candidates spent money, I looked at the overall spend-
ing patterns of candidates. How much money did normal winners spend compared to other
candidates?
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Jacobson (1978, 2004) posited that incumbents with strong opponents and close elec-
tions would spend more money than candidates in easier election. Would this same in-
formation apply to normal winners versus candidates in close races? The average amount
spent by likelihood of winning is in Table 4.1 for the House of Representatives and Table
4.2 for the Senate. Because Senate candidates spend so much more than House candidates
on average, the two chambers are separated. Normal losers are excluded because they tend
to have difficulty raising much money, so they spend much less but for different reasons.
Normal winners are candidates considered to be “solid” by the Cook Political Report.
When comparing all normal winners to all candidates in close races, the normal winners
spend less money on average. This same pattern holds when only looking at incumbents
and only looking at open seats. This pattern is similar to the pattern found by Jacobson;
candidates who are more confident in their ability to win an election spend less money on
average than candidates in close battles.
Looking at the expenditures of these candidates a little more closely will show more
about the variation between different types of candidates. Table 4.3 shows the average
amount that normal winners and candidates in competitive races spent on different cam-
paign activities when running for the House of Representatives. It includes administrative
costs (described as “the operational costs of running a campaign, including staff salaries
and benefits, travel expenses, office rent, utilities, equipment, office supplies and postage,
taxes, food, meetings and administrative services such as accounting, compliance and le-
gal fees”), campaign expenses (which includes “the most direct costs of campaigning,
including political consultants, rallies, promotional material such as signs and buttons,
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polling/surveys/research, get-out-the-vote expenses, and direct mail not related to fundrais-
ing”), fundraising expenses (“money spent to raise money, including event expenses, direct
mail appeals, telemarketing, consultants and online contribution services”), media (includ-
ing “payments for advertising and media production, including TV and radio air time, print
advertising, blast faxes, phone banks, Internet ads and media consultants”), and transfers
and contributions (such as “transfers and contributions from the candidate to federal and
non-federal parties, candidates committees and leadership PACs, and other political com-
mittees”) (Center for Responsive Politics). Some spending by candidates may not be in-
cluded in the chart if it did not fit into one of these categories. The information in this chart
and table provide a lot of insight into the places that different types of candidates spend
their money.
For administrative costs, the difference in spending between normal winners and com-
petitive candidates is not statistically different. While normal winners do spend less than
competitive candidates on average, these differences do not appear to account for the sig-
nificant spending difference between normal winners and competitive candidates.
Campaign expenses, which includes things such as mailings and rallies, does show a
significant difference between the actions of normal winners and competitive candidates.
Normal winners are refraining from holding as many events and sending as much informa-
tion to voters. While they do some advertising in this manner, they do a significant amount
less than competitive candidates. This provides some support for the theory that normal
winners make a decision to stop spending money even when the funds are available.
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Normal winners also spend less money on events and activities geared toward fundrais-
ing activities, spending only about 60% of the amount that competitive candidates do,
which is a significant difference. This provides some support for Jacobson’s theory that
expected winners in non-competitive elections choose to spend little money because they
want to avoid having to ask for it. Because normal winners seem to put less effort into
raising money than other candidates, they have less money to spend, which accounts for
some of the differences in candidates’ spending patterns.
Candidates also have an option of spending money on media. They can buy advertise-
ments on television and the internet and must pay the costs to create these ads. Candidates
in competitive races spend significantly more money on media than other types of candi-
dates. Normal winners, on average, spent less than 15% of what competitive candidates did
in this area. Buying media appears to be the largest difference in spending between normal
winners and competitive candidates.
This provides support for the theory that normal winners are basing their decisions on
how much money they want to spend, rather than how much money is available. Normal
winners for the House of Representatives have the ability to spend far more than $150,000
per election on advertising but make the decision to avoid doing so. This allows them to
avoid voters seeing them too frequently and discourages voters from paying attention to the
election.
Finally, candidates have the option of giving money to other campaigns and some do
so readily. In fact, the average normal winner for the House spent more money on other
candidates than advertising for his or her own election, with an average of over $300,000
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being given to other candidates or parties. This shows that candidates are fine with spending
money in the election; they just do not want to spend the money on their own elections.
They would rather have other candidates use the funds than use the money themselves.
This demonstrates some flaws to the theory that these candidates spend little money
because they want to keep war chests. If candidates were really primarily motivated by the
desire to save money, they would not give away such large portions of their funds. Instead,
they would keep the money in the bank for the next election with the hope that it would
discourage future challengers and help them to ensure victory should a quality challenger
emerge.
This also means there are some flaws in the argument that normal winners are primarily
motivated by a lack of desire to raising money in future elections. All of that money
could be saved and help normal winners to avoid asking for so many donations in the next
election. These donations amount to about 17% of the total funds normal winners had in
the bank during the election, as shown in Table 4.4. If normal winners were so opposed to
asking for money for themselves, they would not be willing to do it for the benefit of other
candidates.
A regression analysis for this data is shown in Table 4.5. This examines some of the
other possible factors that may be contributing to spending patterns as well as likelihood
of winning. It includes a dummy variable for normal winners, who are those considered
“solid” by the Cook Political Report, normal loser, who are the opposite, and all other can-
didates as the baseline category. Normal winners spent an average of $1.6 million less than
more competitive candidates. The biggest difference in spending was for media purposes,
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where competitive candidates spent, on average, nearly $1.4 million more than normal
winners. Normal winners also spent significantly less on administrative costs ($204,000),
campaign expenses ($159,000), and fundraising ($130,000). However, normal winners do-
nated an average of $227,000 more to other candidates and parties than other candidates.
Table 4.6 shows this same information but rather than the raw number of dollars candi-
dates spent, it looks at the percentage of available funds candidates spent on each of their
expenses. Overall, normal winners choose to spend a lower percentage than other candi-
dates, usually saving about 25% of their funds while competitive candidates save less than
5%. In addition to the savings, normal winners transfer nearly 20% more of their funds to
other candidates and parties. Normal winners only spend about half of their funds, with the
other half going to savings and donations. The biggest difference between normal winners
and competitive candidates is in media, where competitive candidates spend 40% less of
their funds than competitive candidates. Normal winners spend a larger percentage of their
money on administrative costs, campaign expenses, and fundraising though the differences
are each less than 7%.
One of the big differences here is the amount normal winners spend on raising funds.
They actually use a larger portion of their funds for this purpose than any other level of
candidate, with the average normal winner in the dataset spending over 10% of his or her
funds to ask for money. This provides further opposition to the theory that normal winners
are primarily motivated by a lack of desire to ask for money; they spend a large percentage
of their available funds begging than any other type of candidate.
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Conclusions
Political candidates carefully choose strategies that they believe will help them to suc-
ceed on election day. Casual observers of elections may believe this means that candidates
always fight for every vote by trying to gain the support of as many people in the con-
stituency as possible. It may appear that they campaign regardless of the circumstances
and fight to convince as many voters as they can.
Among many candidates, this is not the case. Normal winners generally save money at
the end of an election rather than spending everything they have to host more events and
air more advertisements.
One of the possible explanations for this behavior, and the one most favored by re-
searchers such as Gary Jacobson (2004), is that candidates choose to save money because
they do not want to raise money if it is not necessary. While Jacobson is almost certainly
correct that candidates strongly dislike this part of their job, the data does not support this as
the primary reason why expected winners choose to save money at the end of the election.
Normal winners for the House of Representatives spend an average of nearly $120,000 to
raise money on average while Senate normal winners spending just over half of a million
dollars. This amounts to a larger percentage of their spending than any other type of can-
didate. Then, they turn around at the end of the election cycle and give the money away,
with the average House normal winner donating more than $300,000 at the conclusion of
the election. Senate normal winners donate far more, with the average Senate normal win-
ner donating nearly $1.5 million to other candidates and parties. By making such large
donations at the end of the election, normal winners are required to raise more funds in
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the future than would have needed if they had saved that money. These donations account
for about 15% of the average candidate’s total funds for the electoral season, which could
mean 15% less asking for money in the next election. While raising money may not be
desirable, it does not explain the actions of normal winners. Normal winners spend too
much time and money to raise additional funds and give too much money away for this to
be the explanation for their lack of massive spending.
The second possible explanation for reduced spending for normal winners was that they
want to save a war chest. If war chests can discourage challengers from entering future
elections and help normal winners to defeat them if they do enter, normal winners would
consider saving money rather than spending everything. However, this does not seem to
be the case either given the data, which shows normal winners giving away so much of
their money. In fact, the average normal winner would increase his or her cash on hand at
the end of the election by 60% by refusing to make donations. The average House normal
winner could save $750,000 in the bank to scare off challengers in future elections and
ensure victory if a strong challenger does enter. Instead, such a representative saves less
than half a million - still a significant amount of money but not as secure of a war chest.
For Senate normal winners, they could save $3.5 million but they choose to save only $2
million, on average. Again, this money can help but is not going to make as strong of an
impact.
Because most normal winners do save some of their money at the conclusion of the
election, there is some evidence that they are partially motivated by a lack of desire to raise
funds and an interest in keeping a war chest. However, since candidates give away such
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large sums of money, that cannot be their full motivation.
The third possible explanation was that normal winners choose not to spend more be-
cause they believe that it is not advantageous to do so. In this case, spending extra funds
on advertising, raising funds, and campaign events is avoided because candidates believe
they are better off by limiting exposure. When normal winners are seen too much by the
public, they believe it will actually hurt their chances, or at least not improve their chances,
of winning the election, according to this theory. Increased attention to the election could
increase voter awareness of the candidates and make it more difficult for the normal win-
ner; the election could turn into a competitive race. This is the opposite of the old saying
that all publicity is good publicity - normal winners prefer to limit their exposure.
This must be the theory that best explains the actions of these normal winner. These
normal winners are not trying to avoid raising funds; they are raising money in each election
regardless of the circumstances. These candidates are not afraid to spend money because
they want to keep a war chest; they are giving money away to other candidates. Normal
winners must be making a decision about how much money they want to spend on their
election and then they stop. They do not continue to advertise. They do not hire more
staffers. They do not spend more money to drive around the state or district campaigning.
Instead, they make the decision to quit spending money. This strategic decision to avoid
additional spending on their own campaigns provides strong support for the theory that
normal winners want to avoid a visible campaign. The primary monetary goal is not to
save a war chest or to avoid raising money; it is to prevent voters from noticing that the
election is approaching.
77
We are currently in a period in which voters claim anti-incumbent sentiment throughout
the country. The approval rating of Congress is at near record lows. Candidates for all levels
of elected office fear their opponents and do everything they can to claim electoral victory.
For many candidates, this means campaigning as much as possible. But for normal winners,
the story is different. Their strategy for being most successful is to avoid spending copious
amounts of money. They have the funds to spend more but make the choice to refrain
from campaigning excessively. It is not because they want to keep a war chest or because
they want to avoid raising money. It is because they fear the consequences of an all-out
campaign. They fear what will happen if too much attention is drawn to their campaign.
And they fear that their opponents will jump at the opportunity to win over voters and turn
the elections into close races. To prevent such a scenario, they refrain from spending more
than the bare minimum.
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Table 4.1: Average Spending in House, by Type of Candidate, in Thousands of Dollars
Incumbent Open Seat
Normal 1,182 1,195
Winners (781) (1,239)
N 626 33
Competitive 2,561 1,718
Candidates (1,133) (759)
N 164 91
t 18.14 2.83
p(T < t) 0.000 0.003
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average spending in the area for all House candidates in thousands of dol-
lars. T-values are calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source of data: Center for Responsive Politics.
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Table 4.2: Average Spending in Senate, by Type of Candidate, in Thousands of Dollars
Incumbent Open Seat
Normal Winners 6,439 4,336
(5,057) (1,925)
N 34 3
Competitive Candidates 11,364 8,291
(5,688) (9,537)
N 20 24
t 3.30 0.70
p(T < t) 0.001 0.244
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average spending in the area for all Senate candidates in thousands of dol-
lars. T-values are calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source of data: Center for Responsive Politics.
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Table 4.3: Average Spending in House, by Type of Candidate, in Thousands of Dollars
Admin. Campaign Fundraising Media Transfers and N
Expenses Contributions
Normal Winners 305 217 120 158 304 432
(314) (234) (125) (272) (285)
Competitive Candidates 464 353 203 1,281 35.9 136
(6,221) (253) (364) (1,342) (91.9)
t 0.53 5.76 4.01 16.37 10.79
p(T < t) 0.596 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average spending in the area for all House candidates in thousands of dol-
lars. T-values are calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source of data: Center for Responsive Politics.
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Table 4.4: Portion of Funds Spent on Self and Donated, by Type of Candidate
Total On Own Donated
Campaign
Normal Winners 0.743 0.522 0.221
(0.197) (0.206) (0.165)
N 696 432 432
Competitive Candidates 0.977 0.932 0.045
(0.035) (0.063) (0.047)
N 483 115 115
t 25.82 21.07 11.31
p(T < t) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average spending in the area for all House candidates in thousands of dol-
lars. T-values are calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source of data: Center for Responsive Politics.
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Table 4.5: Total Dollars in Thousands Spent by Candidates by Type of Expense
Total Admin. Campaign Fundraising Media Transfers and
Spent Expenses Contributions
Normal Winner -1,613 -204 -159 -130 -1,374 227
(-10.32) (-3.65) (-4.12) (-5.11) (-12.27) (3.56)
Normal Loser -2,038 -65.7 -136 -121 -538 49.9
(-12.49) (-0.24) (-0.73) (-1.98) (-2.05) (0.16)
Senate 5,495 1,481 771 437 3,755 712
(29.95) (13.11) (9.90) (8.50) (16.58) (5.52)
Open -627 14.0 -257 -110 -587 -452
(-3.27) (0.08) (-2.24) (-1.45) (-1.76) (-2.38)
Challenger -794 -258 -114 -129 -896 -89.2
(-3.98) (-2.31) (-1.48) (-2.54) (-4.00) (-0.70)
Democrat -65.8 -15.6 -4.76 -62.4 14.3 -26.1
(-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.16) (-3.08) (0.16) (-0.51)
Year 2010 136 20.8 31.2 16.0 39.8 10.7
(1.37) (0.47) (1.02) (0.79) (0.45) (0.21)
(Intercept) 2,777 507 364 274 1,487 81.9
(16.47) (7.51) (7.82) (8.91) (10.99) (1.06)
R2 0.46 0.31 0.20 0.19 0.49 0.08
Observations 1604 597 597 597 597 597
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Normal losers
are candidates challenging candidates considered “solid.” All other candidates are considered com-
petitive candidates are the baseline category. Coefficients are calculated using regression analysis.
Z-values in parentheses. Source of data: Center for Responsive Politics.
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Table 4.6: Percentage Spent by Candidates by Type of Expense
Total Admin. Campaign Fundraising Media Transfers and
Spent Expenses Contributions
Normal Winner -0.203 0.068 0.040 0.020 -0.406 0.194
(-18.99) (3.63) (3.18) (2.23) (-12.32) (12.46)
Normal Loser -0.023 0.058 0.025 -0.013 -0.090 0.023
(-2.08) (0.64) (0.40) (-0.31) (-0.56) (0.31)
Senate -0.004 -0.003 -0.038 -0.008 0.255 -0.025
(-0.33) (-0.07) (-1.48) (-0.43) (3.82) (-0.80)
Open 0.053 0.078 -0.024 -0.013 -0.183 0.016
(4.06) (1.41) (-0.64) (-0.48) (-1.86) (0.33)
Challenger 0.053 0.005 0.045 -0.026 -0.090 -0.006
(3.91) (0.14) (1.80) (-1.45) (-1.37) (-0.19)
Democrat 0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.028 -0.009 0.023
(1.01) (0.41) (0.27) (-3.95) (-0.35) (1.83)
Year 2010 0.010 -0.011 0.018 -0.001 0.001 -0.019
(1.43) (-0.77) (1.81) (-0.09) (0.04) (-1.50)
(Intercept) 0.935 0.19 0.131 0.105 0.521 0.037
(81.18) (8.45) (8.63) (9.74) (13.06) (1.97)
R2 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.26 0.27
Observations 1604 597 597 597 597 597
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Normal losers
are candidates challenging candidates considered “solid.” All other candidates are considered com-
petitive candidates are the baseline category. Coefficients are calculated using regression analysis.
Z-values in parentheses. Source of data: Center for Responsive Politics.
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5 I’M A NORMAL WINNER AND I APPROVED NO MESSAGE
One of the biggest expenses of many campaigns is television advertisements. The av-
erage 30 second campaign advertisement on local TV costs about $350 for each airing.
Many candidates air ads hundreds of times and must pay to have the ads created, which can
result in costs of hundreds of thousands - or even millions - of dollars. In 2012, about $3
billion was spent on television advertising for national elections, which was nearly half of
all money spent on campaigns.
The ads that aired throughout the country were diverse in content. Virginia Foxx, a
Republican representative from North Carolina, aired an ad in which she discussed low-
ering the nation’s debt, a popular topic for 2012 ads. She said that the debt the United
States currently holds is a “burden that threatens the future of our children and grandchil-
dren,” adding that “stops job creation dead in its tracks.” She said she would “protect the
promises made to senior citizens,” though she never explained what promises or how she
would achieve them. Throughout this discussion, she showed average looking citizens who
appeared to be distressed because of their financial situations. She followed this by show-
ing herself, meeting with constituents (Foxx 2012). She went on to win her election fairly
easily, 57.5%-42.5%. Why would Foxx choose to air an ad with so little content?
Rogers Williams, running for an open congressional seat in Texas, took a very different
approach. He aired a 90 second ad in which he labeled himself “The Donkey Whisperer.”
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He spent the ad walking around in a field full of donkeys, discussing the lives of the donkeys
to life under President Obama. He said things like “You know, all these [donkeys] want is
more shelter, they want more feed and the government is making it harder on me, they’re
taxing me to death.” He says “These donkeys don’t live in the United States of France,
they live in the United States of America.” He tells one donkey “if [he] can get Obama
out of healthcare, [he] can get [the donkey’s] teeth fixed.” Most of the advertisement is
dedicated to promoting the idea that Obama is hurting the country but does not tell much
about Williams’ plans to fix it if elected (Williams 2011). Despite taking quite a differ-
ent approach than Foxx, the outcome was very similar; Williams defeated his Democratic
opponent by about 20 points.
Randy Brock, a Republican state senator from Vermont, took an approach similar to
Williams’ in his campaign against incumbent Peter Shumlin for governor. He ran an ad-
vertisement in which the camera follows bears walking through the woods for the full 45
seconds. The narrator says “There’s a bear in the woods. For most people in Vermont,
the bear is easy to see. But others, like Governor Shumlin, don’t see the bear at all. Why
can’t Governor Shumlin see any of the bears?” The ad continues by saying Shumlin sup-
ports “job killing cloud taxes” and “healthcare choices and freedom being taken.” The
narrator finishes the advertisement by saying “If there are clearly bears in the woods, why
can’t Governor Shumlin see any of them? Isn’t it smart to look out for bears, since there
are bears?” (Brock 2012). This ad, unlike the two previously discussed, goes right after
Brock’s opponent. Like the Williams ad, the visuals and audio are a bit unusual, using an-
imals to make the point. Why did these candidates choose to display themselves this way
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to voters? What leads candidates to select the ads they air and what factors influence their
decisions?
While advertising does not tell us everything about what will happen in an election, it
can inform voters about candidates’ goals and ideals. Ads can help voters to learn about
candidates, notice candidates that might otherwise attract little attention, and persuade.
The content of political ads is not chosen at random; candidates strategically choose what
messages they think will be appropriate for the campaign. What leads a candidate to choose
different types of ads? To answer that question, the first step is to consider, in more depth,
the possible purposes of television ads.
Information from advertising
Advertising can encourage learning about elections. The influence of ads on informa-
tion has been widely studied, though the results are mixed.
The expectation that voters can learn from campaign ads rests on the assumption that
those ads contain information about the candidates. After all, only when voters are in-
formed about the candidates can they have the knowledge that will allow them to make
“correct” decisions, choosing the candidates closest to themselves (Bartels 2000, Kelley
1960). Campaign advertisements can be one way to provide that information, packaged
in a direct and simple way (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004), though not all ads tell
voters much information about the candidates.
Researchers have found that positive ads generally contain little information that will
inform voters about the issues. They tend to discuss the personal qualities of the candidates
with very little issue content that can tell the voters about the candidates’ policy goals.
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While voters may still be able to learn something about the candidates, the information
provided tends to be limited to personal factors (Geer 2005, Mayer 1996).
While voters appear to learn little from positive advertisements, research suggests that
they do learn from negative advertisements. One reason is that negative ads tend to contain
more information about the issues and policy goals of the candidates (Geer 2005, Mayer
1996). In addition, voters often give more weight to the information that learned from
negative ads than positive ads (Holbrook et al. 2001, Marcus and MacKuen 1993).
These patterns imply that voters can learn from televisions advertisements, but are more
likely to learn from some than others. If normal winners are choosing to air advertisements,
would they stay positive or go negative?
Based on the theory outlined in Chapter 2, normal winners are not expected to want
voters to learn much about the candidates and the election. Under normal circumstances,
when most voters are not paying much attention to the election, normal winners will win
by definition. When those conditions change, normal winners may lose the security they
previously felt. One of the things that can cause a shift for normal winners is if people
start paying attention to the candidates and learning more about them. While some voters
may learn things that they like about the normal winner, they were likely already planning
to vote for him or her, given that normal winners are expected to have the support of the
majority of voters, so they will not influence the outcome of the election.
However, some voters may learn things that they do not like about the normal winner.
This possibility has the potential to shift votes, as some voters may begin to support the
normal loser given this new information. If enough of these voters are shifting, the election
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suddenly could turn into a close race, with no normal winner or loser - just two candidates
who each have the potential to win.
If normal winners’ primary goal is to win the election without letting to become a com-
petitive race, they would be expected to avoid providing voters with a lot of information that
could influence them. This means that they may avoid airing advertisements completely,
as all ads could provide some information to voters. But, when normal winners do buy
airtime, they are unlikely to choose negative ads, which tend to be more informative. To
normal winners when considering whether to air ads and the content of any that are aired,
the ignorance of voters is bliss.
Effects of advertising on turnout
Along with the ability to provide information to voters, advertisements may have some
ability to influence turnout. While many people will make the decision whether or not
to vote regardless of the campaigns at the time, some may make a decision based on the
candidates and their campaigns.
As election day approaches, citizens need to make a decision about whether or not the
election is important enough to go to the voting both. Some citizens have already made the
decision to participate well in advance of the election. These citizens make the decision to
vote in all elections, or at least all elections of certain types. For these voters, not much
could change their minds. The events of a single campaign will do nothing to convince
these voters to stay home on election day.
Others are tuned out of the election completely and have made the decision to stay
home on election day. Even the most exciting campaigns could not motive these citizens
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to pay attention, make decisions from the nominated candidates, and take the time to get to
the polling booths to vote.
Many voters, however, fit into a third category. They vote in some elections and stay
home for others. They make the decision to vote or stay home based on the circumstances
at the time. They can be motivated by campaigns some years and discouraged from voting
in others. There are many factors that can lead to the decision to turnout on election day
and one of them is advertising.
There has been significant research about the purposes of advertising and its affects
on turnout. Some research has demonstrated that negative advertising demobilizes the
electorate (Ansolabehere et al. 1994, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Contrary to the
previously held belief that an increase in political stimulation would increase the probability
of voting (Campbell et al. 1966), Ansolabehere et al. find that “exposure to negative
advertisements dropped intentions [to vote] by 5%.”
Others (Finkel and Geer, 1998) have found that some citizens are mobilized by nega-
tive advertising. It can increase the amount of information that some citizens have about
the election, which actually makes them more likely to vote. At times, these types of adver-
tisements provide information that traditional news sources do not (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha,
1995; McClure and Patterson, 1974). Additional knowledge about the election can help
potential voters make more informed decisions, which makes them more likely to partici-
pate on election day. Regardless of whether negative advertising mobilizes or demobilizes
voters, if candidates running for office believe turnout can be influenced by negative adver-
tising, it may motivate them to create and air more negative ads.
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Positive ads do less than negative ads to influence turnout. They tend to be forgotten
more quickly and do less to motivate voters (Lau 1985, Finkel and Geer 1998). If candi-
dates do not want to influence the turnout in the election, they may be more likely to use
positive ads rather than negative ads.
Certainly, not all candidates can influence turnout significantly. For example, during
a presidential election year, it is unlikely many candidates for mayor or city council will
do much to influence the decision of voters to go to the polls or to stay home. However,
to the extent that candidates believe they can influence turnout, they will likely gear their
strategies to influence it in the way that is best for their campaign. Some candidates will
choose advertising strategies with the hope of motivating voters while others may try to
keep people home.
Under normal circumstances with normal turnout, a normal winner will win the elec-
tion by definition. Therefore, normal winners would be expected to use few ads during
their campaigns that might influence the number of people voting. While negative ads have
the potential to motivate their base, they also have the potential to encourage voters that are
on the fence to stay home. Or, such advertisements could encourage some to vote when
they otherwise would not. The risk is not worth taking, since the normal winners would
win without these influences. Therefore, normal winners are unlikely to air negative adver-
tisements that might influence the turnout in the election. This will help normal winners to
maintain the normality of the election, prevent a shift in the voting population, and ensure
that the election will not become a close race.
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To Persuade
One other clear purpose of campaign advertisements is to persuade potential voters.
Certainly, some people will be influenced which way to vote by events throughout the
campaign.
There has been surprisingly little research on the persuasive abilities of campaign ads.
This is largely a result of Klapper’s “minimal effects” hypothesis in which he argued that
people choose to accept the messages they agree with and ignore the rest (1960). This
selective exposure and selective retention was believed to result in very little ability for
candidates to influence voters through advertisements. This became the widely believed
finding in the discipline for many years.
More recently, experimental studies have allowed scholars to revisit the question and
have challenged that conclusion, finding that advertisements do seem to influence voters
(Chang 2001, Meirick, 2002, Valentino, Hutchings, & Williams 2004). However, the re-
sults are not always consistent; only some voters tend to be persuadable and only some of
the time (Leighley 2004). Candidates may believe that the content of their ads can convince
some voters to change their opinions on the election, and may choose to run advertisements
with that goal in mind.
Without persuading any voters in either direction, normal winners will claim victory on
election day. If all voters vote consistently with their normal behavior, which is to say that
no one has been persuaded from his or her traditional preference, the election will never
become a close race and the results will be highly predictable in advance. This is the ideal
situation for normal winners as it provides them confidence that they will hold office at the
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conclusion of the election. Because of that, normal winners are unlikely to run televised ads
that may persuade voters. While such ads have the potential to gather additional support
for the normal winners, they do not need it; they will win without new voters on their side.
Expectations
Given the possible reasons candidates might run advertisements, what are the expecta-
tions of what types of candidates run which types of ads?
Normal winners, in general, are expected to want few of the things that television ad-
vertisements provide. Their goal is to avoid the election turning into a race. They do not
generally want to inform voters about their views or the views of their opponents as this
can influence opinions and sway the public. They do not need to persuade voters; they are
already expected to win the election by definition. And, they have no incentive to try to
influence turnout because again, by definition, they will be victorious with normal turnout
in the election.
Because normal winners do not want to change the outcome of the election from where
it would have been without the ads, this leads to the expectation that they are unlikely to
even run campaign ads prior to election day. Normal winners may not want to change the
status quo, as they will win without trying to change the minds of any voters. Therefore,
opting to skip ads altogether or air them very close to the election day when voters have
already decided on their preferred candidates is the expected strategy of such candidates.
When normal winners do run ads, they are unlikely to run negative ads. Negative ads
can influence turnout, persuade voters, and provide information; normal winners are not
expected to want any of these things. By changing the opinions of some voters, these types
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of ads can change the election from being “normal.” While ads in general could change
the election, positive ads that focus on personal information are much less likely to swing
the election that negative ads. Normal winners are likely to avoid running ads completely.
When they do run ads, they are expected to be positive and personal, not negative or issue
based.
Why Study Television Advertisements?
As discussed in Chapter 3, not every candidate runs televised ads during an election.
Unlike websites, where nearly every candidate has one, tv commercials are only used by a
portion of the candidates running for office. While some candidates choose not to run ads
for strategic purposes or due to lack of money, many others do not advertise on television
because tv markets rarely fit well with electoral districts. For example, there are more than
twenty congressional districts that are at least partially within the New York City media
market. The costs of advertising for a candidate in one of these districts are high while
most of the people who would see advertisements could not even vote in the election. This
presents some concerns as it becomes harder to determine the strategy of candidates who
are not running ads.
One other problem with tv ads is that they tend to be very brief. Unlike websites, which
offer essentially unlimited space, candidates can only fit a small amount of content into
30-60 seconds during the break of a tv show. However, this provides a glimpse into what
the candidates believe are the most important things to tell potential voters. With such
limited time, the goal of the advertisement needs to be front and center. This may help to
understand what candidates want voters to see more than any other possible topics.
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One other advantage of television ads is that most people see then. While very few
voters visit the websites of candidates, most people see at least some advertisements in
districts with heavy advertising.
Like websites, television advertisements are not perfect in helping to determine the
strategy of the average candidate. However, where one falls short, the other one tends to
succeed. If the same strategies seem to exist in both, it implies that the overall message that
candidates want voters to see is consistent across their campaigns.
How to Study Campaign Ads
Since 1998, the Wisconsin Advertising (WiscAds) Project at the University of Wiscon-
sin has collected and coded all political advertisements that aired in the 100 largest media
markets throughout the country. The Campaign Media Analysis Group tracks informa-
tion throughout campaigns and compiles an extensive collection of advertisements. The
WiscAds Project then codes the ads to reflect every single airing of advertisements for con-
gressional and gubernatorial elections. Each airing provides information about when and
where the advertisement aired (time, date, and media market), the sponsors of the ad, and
the content. The content includes such information as the overall tone of the ad (was it for
attacking the opponent or supporting the sponsor), who was pictured or discussed in the ad
(the candidate, the opponent, other politicians or celebrities), and whether specific issues
were discussed (such as jobs, energy, or homosexuality).
For all candidates in the 2008 congressional and gubernatorial elections, I include all
ads that were run by their campaigns. This does not include advertisements from PACs or
other organizations that may have run ads regarding specific candidates, as those provide
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no information about the strategies of the candidates themselves. From there, I could see
the overall messages that candidates had for voters by looking at the total number of ad-
vertisements that contained issues, pictures or mentions of opponents and other politicians,
and personal information, as well as the portion of ads that contained such information. For
some candidates, especially those who only aired one or two separate ads, this may mean
that 100% of their ads contain a certain type of information. For others, the ads are more
split between different types of information.
Out of 435 elections for the House of Representatives, 45 candidates had no opponent
from the other major party (or, in 27 of the cases, no opponent at all). One senator also
lacked a major party opponent. While four of these candidates (three representatives and
the senator) did run ads, the decision to air advertisements for these candidates is likely
quite different than the decisions made by other types of candidates since they must not
have been trying to ensure victory since it was already nearly guaranteed. Because of that,
I have excluded them from this analysis.
From there, the ratings from the Cook Political Report were matched with the candi-
dates. Like in previous chapters, expected winners in seats considered “solid” are normal
winners, their opponents are considered normal losers, and all other candidates are consid-
ered to be in close races.
Results
The first step is to evaluate how likely normal winners are to run ads at all. Many of the
normal winners running for office (those who are projected as being “solid” according to
the Cook Political Report) refrained from airing any television advertisements. Out of 301
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normal winners with opponents for the House of Representatives, only 86 of them, or less
than 30%, ran at least one ad. This fits with the expectations and findings in Chapter 4 that
normal winners air few ads overall.
Candidates in close races were significantly more likely to run television ads than nor-
mal winners and aired them with more frequency. Table 5.1 shows the difference in the
average number of ads aired for normal winners and candidates in close races. This counts
each individual time an ad airs as one. I excluded normal losers from this analysis because
they often ran few ads due more to financial constraints than by choice. The average normal
winner who bought any advertising time aired about 1100 ads while the average candidate
in a close race aired more than twice as many. However, the number of ads aired was
drastically different based on the type of election. Candidates for the Senate and governor
aired far more ads on average than candidates for the House of Representatives so I have
displayed them separately in the table. The pattern of normal winners airing less ads than
candidates races holds across all three election types. In each, candidates in close races
average more than twice as many ads aired than their normal winner counterparts.
It is possible to examine the content of the messages to determine whether normal win-
ners include different types of information in their ads than other candidates. The average
proportion of candidates’ ads that mention their opponents is in Table 5.2. In just over one-
eighth of ads, normal winners mention their opponent in any way; more than two-thirds
of the ads aired by other candidates mention their opponents. Normal winners appear to
focus on themselves while other candidates are much more likely to discuss their com-
petition. This is further confirmed by examining the overall message of ads. For nearly
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90% of normal winners’ ads, the main goal seems to be to promote themselves. Only 5%
have a primary purpose of attacking the opponent. For other candidates, far fewer ads had
a primary goal of promoting themselves, with nearly 60% intended to either attack their
opponents or contrast the two candidates.
The primary focus of ads is also displayed in Table 5.2. The expectation was that normal
winners would focus on personal information rather than policy issues in their advertise-
ments. There was not much difference in the proportion of ads by each type of candidate
that focused on personal information, with normal winners slightly less likely to focus on
personal information in my sample, though the difference was not statistically significant.
When comparing the proportion of ads that focused on policy information, there was also
no significant difference between normal winners and other candidates.
A further look into this information is in Table 5.3. This looks at the average number
of ads in which House candidates discussed each type of issue rather than the proportion
and is limited to comparing normal winners to competitive candidates, excluding normal
losers. The findings are generally similar to those in Table 5.2, though there is no longer a
significant difference between the number of ads that designed to promote the candidates.
The other big difference is between the number of ads that focus on policy information.
While normal winners spent a larger portion of their ads discussing policy matters, they
actually air less than half the number of policy related advertisements. The same is true for
Senate and gubernatorial candidates - while they are more likely to focus on policy in the
ads they air, they actually air fewer ads discussing policy in total numbers than competitive
candidates.
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A closer examination into the personal information discussed reveals that normal win-
ners do discuss personal information less frequently than other candidates, and the content
of these ads is slightly different than the ads run by normal winners that focus on personal
information. For normal winners, the personal information is almost always about them-
selves. Normal winners claim to be hard working and care about families. Alternatively,
when other candidates focus on personal information, it tends to be about their opponent.
More than 80% of the time, personal information ads run by these candidates were also at-
tack ads, claiming things such as that their opponents have questionable relationships with
lobbyists or that they do not respect women and minorities. Very few of these ads focused
on the personal lives of the competitive candidates running the ads.
To further understand the content of the ads and explain normal winners’ behavior, the
specific types of issues they discussed are examined and displayed in Table 5.4. Like Ta-
ble 5.2, these are the proportions of ads that discussed these issue areas. Normal winners
discussed social issues, such as abortion or gay marriage, in a significantly smaller portion
of their ads than other candidates. This fits with expectations because any candidate who
discusses these issues must take a position. Whereas someone can support education with-
out discussing his or her actual goals, there is no such ability with social issues. Normal
winners appear to avoid discussing these matters more than other candidates.
Instead, normal winners focus on economic issues, social welfare issues, and foreign
affairs. These are much easier to phrase as valence issues. Normal winners, in their ads,
tend to discuss their plans to increase job creation, support strong education, and keep us
safe from terrorists in lieu of telling voters they want to ban abortion or gay marriage.
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These also tend to focus on their own views whereas other candidates tend to discuss their
opponents views on issues. However, what this means is normal winners actually do fre-
quently discuss issues throughout their advertisements, with the majority of ads containing
some message about an issue.
Table 5.5 continues to support these findings, with the average number of each type
of ads displayed, like in Table 5.3. Again, normal losers are excluded. Normal winners
discussed each of these issues less frequently than competitive candidates, on average.
While normal winners did have higher proportions of ads that focused on some of them,
they have lower total ads.
Much like in chapters 3 and 4, these differences still exist when considering other pos-
sible factors that may influence the dependent variable. This analysis includes dummy
variables for Senate and Governors elections, with House candidates as the base category
and for Democrat, with Republicans as the base category. The multivariate analysis for
total number of ads with each primary goal are in Table 5.6 by expectations of winning.
The negative binomial distribution is used in this case because the dependent variable value
is 0 for many of the cases and the coefficients are incidence rate ratios. As in the previ-
ous tables, normal winners seem to air each type of ad less frequently than competitive
candidates.
For each advertisements in which candidates who are not normal winners mention their
opponents, normal winners air just .13 advertisements that mention opponents. Normal
winners’ advertisements focus on attacking their opponents with just .13 advertisements
for each time other candidates’ advertisements focus on attacking. The candidates do not
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have significant differences in the number of advertisements that promote the candidates.
Normal winners are significantly less likely to have their advertisements focus on per-
sonal information or policy information. For each advertisement by other candidates that
focuses on personal information, normal winners run just .25 ads that focus on personal
information. For every advertisement by others that focuses on policy information, normal
winners run .53 ads that focus on policy.
They are also air fewer ads dealing with each policy area, as shown in Table 5.7, which
presents incidence rate ratios, as well. For each advertisement by other candidates that
discusses economic issues, normal winners air .50 ads that discuss economic matters. The
same is true for social welfare policy; normal winners run half as many ads that discuss
social welfare as other candidates. Both of these differences are statistically significant.
The same patterns do not hold for social issues and foreign/defense policy, where the
differences are not statistically different for normal winners and other candidates. While
normal winners did run fewer ads of each type in this sample, the differences are inconclu-
sive for candidates outside of the sample.
It is clear throughout this analysis that normal winners are making the choice to avoid
the discussion of many issues. Most choose not to air a single advertisement. Among those
who do advertise on television, they rarely attack their opponents or discuss information
as position issues. They focus on themselves and discuss how they will fix the economy,
education, and save the world without giving much detail as to how.
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Conclusion
Overall, this information continues to support the conclusions of previous chapters.
Most normal winners are continuing to avoid confrontation. They do not want to make
their elections competitive, so they air few advertisements, start their television campaign
late if at all, and tell voters little about their opponents or specifics about their plans in
office.
This may explain why a candidate like Virginia Foxx aired ads in which she discussed
job creation and helping seniors but did not discuss any of her plans. Her ads focused on
policy information but did not provide any specific details on how to achieve her goals.
Instead, she promoted herself and reassured voters she would work on their behalf. She did
not mention her opponent or take a strong stand on the issues. In turn, she avoided make
the election competitive.
This also shows that Randy Brock’s tactics when he ran for governor of Vermont were
typical of candidates like him. He went on the attack against his opponent in his advertise-
ments, as do most normal losers. He attempted to draw attention to the election and help
voters realize that his opponent should not be reelected. While Brock was not successful in
his challenge, this behavior is typical of candidates like him.
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Table 5.1: Average Number of Ads By Type of Candidate
House Senate Governor
Normal Winners 640 3,301 2,342
(688) (3,237) (2,724)
N 86 15 5
Competitive Candidates 1,586 8,223 7,095
(1,670) (6,230) (4,973)
N 160 28 11
t 5.03 2.85 1.9811
p(T < t) 0.000 0.003 .0338
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average number of ads for House, Senate, and gubernatorial candidates.
T-values are calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source
of data: Wisconsin Advertising Project.
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Table 5.2: Portion of Ads Focusing on Each Area, by Type of Candidate
Mention Promote Attack Focus on Focus on N
Opponent Candidate Opponent Personal Info Policy
Normal Winners 0.132 0.887 0.052 0.111 0.603 106
(0.293) (0.252) (0.153) (0.246) (0.394)
Other Candidates 0.684 0.382 0.234 0.165 0.495 255
(0.349) (0.328) (0.275) (0.254) (0.394)
t 9.56 8.76 4.09 1.31 1.87
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.061
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Coefficients are
average percentage of each type of ads for House candidates. T-values are calculated using a dif-
ference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses.Source of data: Wisconsin Advertising
Project.
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Table 5.3: Total Number of Ads Focusing on Each Area, by Type of Candidate
Mention Promote Attack Focus on Focus on N
Opponent Candidate Opponent Personal Info Policy
Normal 185 517 91.3 75.2 382 106
Winners (719) (475) (428) (243) (415)
Competitive 1,160 723 416 252 825 160
Candidates (1,091) (1,138) (550) (581) (929)
t 8.11 1.77 5.13 2.97 4.62
p-value 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.003 0.000
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average number of each type of ads for House candidates. T-values are
calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source of data:
Wisconsin Advertising Project.
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Table 5.4: Proportion of Ads Discussing Issues, by Type of Candidate
Social Economic Social Welfare Foreign/Defense N
Issues Issues Policy Policy
Normal Winners 0.087 0.748 0.135 0.121 106
(0.123) (0.692) (0.153) (0.146)
Other Candidates 0.214 0.692 0.074 0.161 255
(0.259) (0.664) (0.072) (0.222)
t 9.56 8.76 4.09 0.97
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.166
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Coefficients are
average percentage of ads in each issue area for House candidates. T-values are calculated using a
difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source of data: Wisconsin Advertising
Project.
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Table 5.5: Average Number of Ads Discussing Issues, by Type of Candidate
Social Economic Social Welfare Foreign/Defense N
Issues Issues Policy Policy
Normal Winners 71.0 507 167 189 106
(322) (599) (243) (344)
Competitive Candidates 205 1,187 429 333 160
(239) (1,169) (613) (612)
t 3.90 5.52 4.19 2.21
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028
Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political Report. Competitive can-
didates are any that were in elections considered “likely,” “leaning,” or “toss up” by Cook Political
Report. Coefficients are average number of ads in each issue area for House candidates. T-values
are calculated using a difference of means test. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source of data:
Wisconsin Advertising Project.
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Table 5.6: Focus of Television Ads by Type of Candidate: Total Number of Ads
Mention Promote Attack Focus on Focus on
Opponent Candidate Opponent Personal Info Policy
Normal Winner 0.13 0.91 0.13 0.25 0.53
(7.12) (0.45) (4.43) (3.18) (3.15)
Senate 5.21 4.85 5.37 6.17 4.62
(4.75) (5.93) (3.20) (3.36) (5.78)
Governor 3.56 4.18 3.49 1.11 5.64
(2.32) (3.50) (1.53) (0.12) (4.25)
Democrat 0.49 1.21 0.26 0.49 0.97
(-2.73) (1.03) (3.24) (1.82) (0.14)
Coefficients are incidence rate ratios calculated using regression with negative binomial distribution.
Z-values in parentheses. Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political
Report. All other candidates are in the baseline category. Source of data: Wisconsin Advertising
Project.
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Table 5.7: Content of Ads By Type of Candidate: Total Number of Ads
Social Economic Social Welfare Foreign/Defense
Issues Issues Policy Policy
Normal Winner 0.87 0.50 0.50 0.74
(0.22) (4.56) (2.39) (0.83)
Senate 5.37 4.81 6.11 4.35
(2.06) (7.86) (4.70) (3.16)
Governor 5.31 4.48 5.70 0.51
(1.30) (4.90) (2.95) (0.92)
Democrat 0.77 0.92 1.43 1.84
(0.46) (0.64) (1.37) (1.81)
Coefficients are incidence rate ratios calculated using regression with negative binomial distribution.
Z-values in parentheses. Normal winners are candidates considered “solid” by the Cook Political
Report. All other candidates are in the baseline category. Source of data: Wisconsin Advertising
Project.
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 4 CODING PROCEDURES
All websites were coded by the author. First, they were copied from the Library of
Congress and the Wayback Machine (archive.org) websites and then coded through the
Atlas program. All wording, pictures, and links were coded according to their content
(such as position or valence issue, personal history, or district information) and included
the front page and any pages that could be accessed with a single click (such as issues or
personal information).
Following the initial phase of coding, about 10% of the data was recoded by the author.
This entailed pulling individual phrases and paragraphs from websites at random and cod-
ing them according to the same rules as the initial coding. The benefit of this process is that
many of the passages did not contain enough information to identify the specific website
or candidate to which they belonged. For example, one passage that was recoded was:
Almost everyone has something to say about the high price of health care these
days. While insurance companies continue to raise prices, nothing is being
done to reduce costs for the average consumer. I have a plan called the States
Right to Innovate in Health Care Act that would encourage states to develop
their own systems of universal care by clearing away the underbrush of Federal
regulations. It would provide assistance, through implementation and planning
grants, to help states transition to new regulations and to help states transition
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to universal care. (From Representative John Tierney, Democratic incumbent
from Massachusetts)
There is nothing in the text that informs the reader about the identity of the candidate.
It could be a incumbent or challenger, normal winner or normal loser, it could even be
a man or a woman. While many passages did contain information about the identity of
the candidate, the majority did not. Even when passages contained information about the
candidate, the author rarely remembered enough about the 2008 election to know whether
the candidate was a normal winner, normal loser, or in a close race. Due to the volume of
passages coded and the time between the codings (about eight months), it would have also
been impossible to code based on memory of the candidates’ websites.
The intercoder reliability between the two instances of coding was .78. Most of the
differences between the two attempts was due to leaving off a code rather than changing a
code. One example is from the website of Sam Graves of Missouri. His website said:
Congressman Sam Graves is a life long resident of Missouris 6th Congres-
sional District. As a small businessman and a sixth-generation family farmer.
Sam has spent his life working to make Missouri a better place to live, work,
and raise a family.
The first time I coded the website, I coded this passage as “personal information,”
“experience,” and “incumbency” since he calls himself “Congressman,” which implies he
has held the office previously. In the second coding, I left off “incumbency” since the
passage said little about him holding the office in the past. These types of differences made
up the majority of the variation between the two instances of coding.
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There were a limited number of instances in which the choice of coding something
as a valence issue or position issue was challenging. In particular, several instances of
candidates discussing taxes required the coder to make a difficult decision in how to code
the issue. For example, Oklahoma Republican Representative John Sullivan explained on
his website:
As we work through this rough economic period, it is important that American
families are able to keep as much of their hard earned tax money as possible
with tax credits and incentives and no tax increases.
While Sullivan does not explain specifics as to how he would like tax policies in the
United States, he does take a position that is not exactly benign. Many tax credits have
opposition from some voters and many voters believe that taxes should be increased in
some situations, such as for the very wealthy. However, he also does not list specific tax
credits or incentives he would try to increase, making this less obvious than many passages
on the websites.
To account for the challenges of such passages, particularly those involving taxes, I ran
all analyses with the individual issues separately. For all issues, the relationship was in
the right direction; normal winners were less likely to take positions on issues than other
candidates. There were a few issues in which the relationship was not statistically signifi-
cant, but that was primarily due to having very few cases in which candidates discussed the
particular issue or because some issues cannot really be discussed as valence issues, such
as abortion.
Given that these concerns were addressed in the coding process, I have reason to believe
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that the coding scheme was as accurate as possible.
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